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Abstract: 
Often the fuller the reputational record people‘s actions generate, the greater their incentive to earn 
a reputation for cooperation.  However, inability to ―wipe clean‖ one‘s past record might trap some 
agents who initially underappreciate reputation‘s value in a cycle of bad behaviour, whereas a 
clean slate could have been followed by their ―reforming‖ themselves.  In a laboratory experiment, 
we investigate what subjects learn from playing a finitely repeated dilemma game with 
endogenous, symmetric partner choice.  We find that with a high cooperation premium and good 
information, investment in cooperative reputation grows following exogenous restarts, although 
earlier end-game behaviours are observed. 
Keywords: cooperation, reputation, voluntary contribution, public goods, sorting, endogenous 
grouping, group formation, experiment 
JEL classification codes: C92, D74, D83, H41 
 
# 
Kamei: Department of Economics and Finance, Durham University, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, 
DH1 3LB, UK. Email: kenju.kamei@gmail.com, kenju.kamei@durham.ac.uk. Putterman: 
Department of Economics, Brown University, 64 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912, USA. 
Email: Louis_Putterman@brown.edu. We thank Yunan Ji. Philip Trammell, and Xinyi Zhang for 
their excellent research assistance, and Cheewadhanaraks Matanaporn and Yunan Ji for help 
conducting experiment sessions. We thank two anonymous referees and editor Frederic Vermeulen 
for their helpful comments and suggestions. We also wish to thank Arno Riedl, Ralph Bayer and 
Dietmar Fehr for help on identifying relevant literature.  This project was supported by a research 
grant from the Murata Science Foundation in Japan. 
  
2 
 
 Situations in which cooperation is beneficial but individuals are subject to the temptation to 
free ride are ubiquitous in economic life.  A key factor that facilitates cooperation in some of these 
situations, generically referred to as social dilemmas (Ostrom, 1998; Schulz et al., 2011), is the 
potential to choose with whom one deals and the resulting competition for trustworthy partners.  
When individuals have multiple potential partners, incentives to earn a reputation for 
trustworthiness or cooperation may be strong.   
Laboratory experiments in which subjects play finitely repeated dilemma games have 
confirmed that the ability to choose their partners in such interactions can be a powerful force 
encouraging more cooperative choices (see e.g. Page et al. 2005, and other papers discussed 
below).  But these studies also raise at least two questions that remain understudied.  First, in a 
given finitely repeated interaction among individuals in which beliefs about one another‘s true 
types and beliefs need not initially be accurate, each may only gradually learn the benefit of 
investing in a cooperative reputation.  If her full history of past play is public knowledge, it may be 
too late (or too costly) for an individual who initially underestimated the value of a cooperative 
reputation to rise into the ranks of sought-after co-operators. Are there conditions under which the 
learning attained in earlier finitely-repeated interactions could lead to more investment in 
cooperative reputations if one‘s slate were to be wiped clean?   
Second, in a series of interactions with known last period, as when a group of people 
cooperate on a time-limited project, individuals might cooperate in early periods, but in the last 
interaction all but those with both (a) a true taste for cooperating conditional on others doing so 
and (b) a strong belief that their counterparts will cooperate, will free ride.  If observing such end-
game free riding leads to a downward re-evaluation of beliefs regarding the proportion of co-
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operators in the population, would any tendency to cooperate more in later finitely repeated games, 
thanks to learning reputation‘s benefits, be offset by such end-game learning?  
Whether ―learning to cooperate‖ (learning the value of reputation) or ―learning to free ride‖ 
(mastering backward induction from end-game effects) dominate may be important to know for a 
variety of reasons. Consider the question of whether people should be allowed to hide their past 
behaviours, for instance by changing their names, moving from city to city, or deleting electronic 
records (on which recent legal rulings on the so-called ―right to be forgotten‖—Streitfeld, 2014—
are pertinent).  At first blush, it appears that anything that allows individuals to escape the 
reputational consequences of their past actions in matters of trustworthiness and cooperation will 
weaken incentives to behave well.  Studies that reference the design of online markets such as 
eBay have generally supported designers‘ belief that making establishment of fresh identities 
difficult has favourable effects on overall efficiency (Friedman and Resnick 2001; Kamei 2015). 
But the idea that clean breaks are unhelpful in every setting relies on an implicit assumption that 
when agents enter the world of social interaction, they immediately and accurately size up the 
potential costs and benefits of cooperating.  Social learning may instead require experience, and in 
societies with strong social norms of trustworthiness and cooperation (Herrmann et al., 2008), 
initial underestimates of the benefits of cooperating are possible.  Creating junctures at which 
slates are wiped clean may therefore, at least in some conditions, lead to greater rather than to less 
cooperation, on average.  
If more reputational information were always better than less, societies of immobile 
individuals whose reputations accumulated indefinitely among the same circle of neighbours 
would be better at inducing trustworthy behaviours. Yet researchers find higher levels of trust and 
cooperation in relatively mobile and urbanized societies than in relatively immobile ones in which 
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small communities are the norm (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008; Henrich et al., 2001). In the 
former, people often move from job to job or from location to location with little carry-over of 
reputation. What lessons do they take from past interactions regarding the value of a reputation for 
cooperation? And in the longer term, with what lessons from experience might parents advise their 
children—ones supporting a culture of trust, or ones favouring suspicion of and opportunism 
towards non-kin (Tabellini, 2008)? 
We conduct a laboratory decision-making experiment to obtain detailed data on partner 
preferences, levels of cooperation, and individual and social histories, controlling and varying 
across treatments the possibility of reputation formation and the potential gain from cooperation.  
The distinctive feature of our design is that we combine endogenous partner selection, examined 
previously by a few studies, with the successive playing of multiple finitely repeated super-games 
between which there is no continuity of individual reputation, a novel feature.  In contrast with the 
concern of studies such as Friedman and Resnick (2001), the slate-cleaning we study comes at the 
exogenous breaks between super-games, not at the discretion of individual agents. Like many past 
studies including Bolton et al. (2004), we find considerable evidence of subject investment in 
reputation and of preference for more cooperative partners, and we also replicate the finding of 
sharp end-game decline of cooperation as series of interactions end.  However, we provide the first 
explicit demonstration we are aware of that when there are sufficient gains from cooperation and 
the informational conditions are good enough, the detrimental impact of observing end-game 
effects fails to dominate the tendency of individuals to invest more, not less, in cooperative 
reputation in later finitely repeated games with endogenous matching.
1
 Our data thus suggest that 
                                                          
1
 A more qualified statement would be that the earlier arrival of end-game effects fails to outweigh the strengthening 
of cooperation in the sequence of four super-games observed by us. We do not attempt to project outcomes beyond 
this ―medium-run‖ type horizon. See below. 
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the beneficial effects of competition for partners can survive in a world in which people learn 
about others‘ types and beliefs as they transition from job to job, place to place, or among different 
spheres of interaction.  
Of course, the benefits of clean breaks may be specific to the context.  We make no claim 
that our findings are applicable when the slate-wiping is at the discretion of the actor, who may 
choose to hide her identity for strictly opportunistic reasons.  Our findings may thus have little 
application to the design of e-commerce platforms, but more relevance to situations in which new 
identity formation coincides with transitions not chosen by the actor, or at least not chosen with 
reputation cleansing as a major motive—for instance career changes which occur due to exogenous 
economic shocks, or relocation to a new region due to the needs of a spouse or parent. Our 
conclusions may hint at why modern societies in which people are sometimes forced to ―reinvent 
themselves‖ don‘t necessarily cultivate individuals more inclined towards opportunism and less 
able to cooperate than did traditional ones marked by lower mobility. 
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows.  Section 1 provides a discussion of past 
literature which sets the stage for our study.  In Section 2, we spell out our experimental design 
and discuss theoretical predictions.  Section 3 presents our results and analysis.  Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
1. Literature 
 Consequences of current decisions that operate through reputation are central to inducing 
trustworthiness in a wide variety of transactions, from the selling of non-prescription drugs and 
toothpaste (Erdem and Swait, 1998) to the provision of services like plumbing (McDevitt, 2011) 
and management (Fama, 1980).  In all of these situations, at least one party to a transaction is 
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unable to instantaneously ascertain quality or quantity at the moment of payment and counts on the 
supplier‘s incentive to maintain reputation as assurance of aligned incentives (MacLeod, 2007).  
Agents entering into a partnership or engaging in other forms of collective action face the same 
problem albeit symmetrically: investments are made simultaneously without certainty that others 
are pulling their weight.  If informational conditions permit and group membership is sufficiently 
easy to rearrange, they too can rely on transmission of ex post observation (reputation) as a way to 
deter opportunism, for instance by threat of excluding unreliable group members.   
With potentially infinitely lived entities such as firms, or in indefinitely ongoing 
interactions with sufficiently low termination probabilities and patient agents, cooperation can be 
an equilibrium with standard agents.  Some economic and social situations are better captured, 
however, by models of finite repetition.  Examples include a team working some months on a one-
time project, or a customer navigating a relationship with a service provider (perhaps a painter, or 
a baby-sitter) despite some known end-point (the customer is preparing his house for sale, the 
baby-sitter will soon leave for college). Consider, for example, individuals who must restart a 
career in a new field, as happened for some following the recent ―great recession.‖  Cooperation 
dilemmas in situations of finite repetition hold special theoretical interest because non-standard or 
social preferences and beliefs regarding their distribution may be requirements of cooperation, 
because participants can invest in reputation over time, and because problems of backward 
unravelling threaten to undermine the potential for cooperation among selfish agents with common 
knowledge.  Preferences that might support cooperation include altruism, reciprocity, inequality 
aversion, and warm glow. 
 The cooperation problem most widely used in experimental studies has been the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM, also called public goods game). In each iteration or period, group 
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members allocate tokens between a public and private accounts (Ledyard, 1995). In this 
environment, ―conditional co-operators‖ (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gӓchter, 2010) 
can play a similar role in facilitating cooperation as do tit-for-tat players in the prisoners‘ dilemma 
interactions studied by Kreps et al. (1982).  A conditional co-operator is an agent who prefers 
contributing as much to the public good as do his counterparts,
2
 and a rational selfish agent playing 
a finitely repeated VCM with such an individual may find it payoff maximizing to contribute the 
maximum amount in all periods but the last, then contribute zero. 
 One source of evidence for conditional cooperation is VCM studies in which experimenters 
assign subjects to groups based on their initially observed contribution propensities.  Whereas in 
finitely repeated VCM experiments without sorting cooperation decays over time, contributions by 
high contributors assigned to interact together are relatively sustained (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 
2007; Gӓchter and Thöni, 2005).  This suggests that high contributors tend to reduce their 
contributions in the unsorted experiments not because they are learning to play the game, in a 
general sense, but because they find that their contributions are not adequately reciprocated. 
Groups of similarly behaving subjects can also emerge in the lab through self-sorting. 
Subjects in Page et al. (2005)‘s endogenous regrouping treatment first played three periods of a 
standard VCM game in randomly formed partner groups of four, then were shown the average 
contribution thus far by every participant in their session of sixteen and could assign preference 
rankings based on which new groups were formed.   As in Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2007), but in this 
                                                          
2
 The preference function of the conditional co-operator may be thought of as causing the material payoffs of a 
prisoners‘ dilemma to be associated with ―assurance game‖ (Sen, 1967) or stag hunt game payoffs in utility (or 
psychological) terms.  Alternatively, in our appendix we note that conditionally cooperative behaviours can also be 
rationalised by inequity (or inequality)-averse preferences along the lines of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). While 
Fischbacher and Gӓchter (2010) find that the average conditional co-operator less-than-fully matches her counterparts‘ 
contributions, we simplify discussion in the remainder of our paper by ignoring variation in the degree of 
completeness of reciprocity. 
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case through endogenous group formation, contributors of similar amounts interacted together and 
the typical decay of contributions was absent.   
 Differences of design yield differences of outcome in the lab. Groups may be of fixed size 
(four in Page et al. [2005], two in Coricelli et al. [2004], Bayer [2011] and the present paper) or of 
variable size (Ehrhart and Keser [1999], Ahn et al. [2008, 2009], Charness and Yang [2010]).  
Both sides of each match can have a say about playing together (Page et al. [2005], Bayer [2011], 
this paper, some treatments in Coricelli et al. [2004] and Ahn et al. [2008, 2009]) or individuals 
can join others‘ groups at will (Ehrhart and Keser [1999], some treatments in Ahn et al. [2008, 
2009]).  Details of the matching process also differ—for instance, a second price auction is used in 
Coricelli et al. (2004), a Gale-Shapley stable marriage mechanism in Bayer, majority or plurality 
voting in Ahn et al. (2008, 2009) and Charness and Yang (2010), and a simple ranking and group 
assignment mechanism shared by Page et al. (2005) and the present paper.
3
   
Our focus on reputation and partner choice make the nature of the information subjects 
receive critical.  While subjects in all of the above experiments learn of at least the most recent 
decisions of prospective partners, the persistence of reputation differs, from learning of 
contributions in the most recent periods only, in Ahn et al. (2008, 2009), Bayer (2011), and 
Charness and Yang (2010), to seeing others‘ entire past average contributions, in Page et al. (2005) 
and Coricelli et al. (2004). 
The evidence discussed so far suggests that choice of interaction partners can promote 
cooperation in finitely repeated social dilemmas because there are cooperatively-inclined 
individuals thus enabled to sort and play with one another and because selfish but sophisticated 
                                                          
3
 Related papers include Gürerk et al. (2006) and Lazear et al. (2012) and Aimone et al. (2013).   
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types mimic co-operators. However, extant studies leave open the twin questions posed in our 
introduction: (i) might some individuals invest more rather than less in cooperation after their 
slates are cleaned, due to past learning, and (ii) how is the potentially positive impact of learning 
altered by observing end-game choices?  An initial return of cooperation to earlier levels has been 
found in voluntary contribution experiments without partner choice (Andreoni, 1988), but type-
sorting and investment in reputation play a central role in explaining the higher cooperation levels 
in the environments we‘re discussing, and the impact of observed end-game behaviours has not 
been studied in them.
4
 In a world without partner choice, being able to wipe one‘s slate clean or 
hide one‘s identity has been proven to be harmful to communities if such acts are cost-free and are 
made endogenously by agents. For example, Friedman and Resnick (2001) theoretically show that 
in an infinitely-repeated environment where a fraction of players constantly enter and at the same 
time exit, an option to change one‘s identity at no cost reduces efficiency, and mutual cooperation 
cannot hold as an equilibrium. Wibral (forthcoming) studies the impact of individuals‘ identity 
changes using finitely-repeated trust games with a rating system, where new players enter 
interaction units and the group size becomes large as the experiment proceeds. His experiment 
finds that being able to erase one‘s history via identity change significantly decreases both trust 
and trustworthiness, compared to the situation in which this option is unavailable. Kamei (2015) 
shows that even if both entry and exit are not allowed and players are assigned unique 
identification numbers with which they can send a credible signal and build reputation, having the 
option to hide these identifiers at no cost is harmful for their communities, as some players decide 
to hide their identifiers. His experiments further indicate that fixed identity or cost for hiding may 
be necessary to prevent such opportunistic behaviour. These negative effects of endogenously 
                                                          
4
 Charness and Yang (2010)‘s paper provides a partial exception in that their subjects play two sequential finitely-
repeated games of 15 periods each without reputational carry-over.  However, analysing the effects of the restart is not 
a focus of their paper, and they apply shorter memory within games.  We return to their results in footnote 20, below. 
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changing identities or hiding them, however, may not carry over to our context because we 
consider only exogenous restarts for reputation.  
Andreoni and Miller (1993) study much the same race between ‗learning to invest in 
cooperative reputation‘ and ‗learning backward unravelling‘ as addressed by us, but in prisoners‘ 
dilemma games with exogenously assigned partners.  In their core treatment (see also Selten and 
Stoecker, 1986; Hauk and Nagel, 2001; and for a meta-analysis, Embrey et al., 2014), each period 
of a given ten-period game is played with the same randomly chosen partner, which permits each 
member of the pair to build a reputation as a cooperator even if his intention is to defect before his 
counterpart does.  The subsequent ten-period game is played with a new randomly-assigned 
partner, so reputation cannot carry over.  Andreoni and Miller (1993) find that in their setting 
investment in reputation-building grows across super-games. While end-game defections initially 
become earlier on average, Andreoni and Miller (1993) find that they settle into a relatively 
unchanging pattern after the first few finitely-repeated games.  It is unclear a priori how the play 
of multiple finitely-repeated dilemma games with partner choice will compare to play by subjects 
who cannot select their partners.  On the one hand, competition for the most cooperative partners 
might lead to still greater reputation-building efforts; on the other hand, the possibility of switching 
to other partners mid-way through a super-game might invite earlier defection.  The greater menu 
of options in the VCM than the PD might also affect play.  Thus, while Andreoni and Miller 
(1993) provide a clear reference case for play of multiple finitely-repeated social dilemma games 
without partner choice, investigating the parallel problem in the context of partner choice—a 
setting known in its own right to enhance cooperation—is worthy of new research. 
2. Experimental Design and Predictions 
2.1 Experimental Design 
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In our experiment, subjects belonging to sets of ten anonymous and randomly selected 
participants who remain together throughout their session, play four distinct 10-period sequences 
of VCM stage games, called phases, with no carry-over of reputation from one to the next.  The 
stage game group size is two, with potentially new partners assigned each period based on 
submission of rankings and pairing by mutual preference.   Subject i‘s earnings in period t are 
given by: 
            ∑    
 
   , (1) 
where E is the uniform per-period endowment, which we set at 10 points,     is the contribution of 
subject i in period t, and mpcr, the marginal per capita return from allocations to a pair‘s joint 
account, can also be represented as F/n, with F being the factor by which returns under full 
cooperation exceed those under full free-riding and n being the group size, here 2. We study three 
low gain treatments (LG) in which F = 1.3 and mpcr = 0.65, and three high gain treatments (HG) 
in which F = 1.7 and mpcr = 0.85.   At the end of each period, a subject is informed of her 
partner‘s contribution decision and her own earnings.5 Under each F and mpcr, we vary the degree 
to which reputation stays with a subject during a phase, as explained presently.  
2.1.1 Ranking procedure and information conditions 
Each period, subjects are given the opportunity to choose their partners through ranking. 
We adopt a simple procedure in which each subject is offered a subset of five of the ten set 
members as prospective partners each period thanks to a fresh random division of the set into two 
                                                          
5
 One point exchanged for $0.045 (4.5 cents) at the end of the experiment.  Hence, universal non-contribution for all 
40 periods would yield earnings of 40*10*$0.045 = $18, universal full contributions earnings of $23.40 (in LG 
treatments) or $30.60 (in HG treatments) plus $5 show-up fee.  In the event, overall earnings averaged $22.87 (or with 
show-up fee $27.87), slightly past the mid-way point between average expected earnings with no and those with full 
cooperation. 
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sub-sets of five.
6
  Each subject first sees the Subject IDs (fixed for the 10 period phase) of her 5 
potential partners, and in four of the treatments, also information on their allocations to their joint 
accounts in past periods of the phase, then gives each a rank of 1, 2, …, or 5, with 1 indicating 
most and 5 least preferred counterpart.  As explained to the subjects, the computer searches among 
possible pairs for the match-up with the lowest sum of ranks, breaking ties randomly, then searches 
for a next pairing of the remaining 8 subjects, etc., assigning each set member to one of 5 pairs.
7
   
We vary across treatments the reputational information subjects have access to when 
ranking prospective partners and upon partner assignment.  In high information (HI) treatments, 
subjects at each ranking stage see each of their prospective counterparts‘ average allocation in all 
periods of the phase thus far.  In medium information (MI) treatments, they see the average 
allocation in past periods of which each is randomly selected with probability 0.5, and are also 
shown how many past periods entered the averaging calculation. In low information (LI) 
treatments, they are shown no information on past allocations, but as in other treatments subject 
IDs (fixed within a phase) are shown, so recollection of own recent interactions can inform ranking. 
The crossing of the two gain levels (LG and HG) with the three information conditions (LI, MI and 
HI) yields six treatments, which we refer to as the LI-LG treatment, the MI-HG treatment, etc., as 
displayed in Table 1. 
                                                          
6
 These divisions into sub-sets were adopted partly to speed ranking, since complete rankings could be decided on 
more quickly for five than for nine others.  They also have the benefit of raising reputation‘s potential importance by 
making establishing a partnership with a single counterpart largely infeasible.  
7
 The algorithm translating ranks into partner assignments is identical to that in Page et al. (2005). The simple mutual 
ranking procedure facilitates subject‘s easy recognition of the desirability of playing with higher-contributing partners.  
Mutual ranking solves the problem of ―fleeing from free riders‖ reported by Ehrhart and Keser (1999), while our 
mechanism is easier to explain to subjects than the Gale-Shapley algorithm used by Bayer (2011), is arguably easier 
for subjects to understand than the auction device used by Coricelli et al. (2004), and is more symmetric and requires 
fewer steps than alternatives used by, for instance, Ahn et al. (2008) and Charness and Yang (2010). We simplify our 
design relative to Page et al. (2005)‘s in two minor respects: we eliminate choice over how many to give ranks to, and 
costliness of ranking. These elements appear to have had little impact in their experiment, although models assuming 
uniformly selfish rational type imply that subjects would never elect to submit ranks if doing so is costly.    
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2.2  Predictions 
 If all participants maximizing own payoffs and have common knowledge of this, the 
prediction is the same for all six treatments: universal non-contribution to the joint accounts.  With 
no reason to favour one prospective partner over another, ranks will be assigned randomly, and 
presence of ranking and pair assignment procedures will have no impact on play.
 
 
 However, decades of experimental studies, including both Andreoni and Miller (1993) and 
past partner choice studies, indicate that the assumptions just applied are unlikely to yield good 
predictions.  These studies suggest behaviours more consistent with models like Kreps et al. 
(1982) in which the decision-makers attach positive probability to the presence of some actors who 
prefer cooperative actions.  While attempts at cooperation are observed even with random partner 
assignment, the potential to switch partners gives any individual wishing to encourage cooperation 
from her counterpart an additional source of leverage, since she can now implicitly threaten not 
simply to reduce her contributions if the partner is not sufficiently reciprocating, but to exit the 
relationship and to enter into one with a better partner.  The possibility provides reason to continue 
to make large contributions so as to increase or maintain one‘s attractiveness in the market for 
partnerships.   
In our Appendix, we provide a partial equilibrium model which shows that if all agents 
belong to one of two types—selfish payoff-maximisers, and conditional cooperators—then in any 
given phase (finitely-repeated super-game), there is a finite number of periods, k, over which the 
selfish players find it rational to contribute to their joint accounts at the same level as a conditional 
cooperator, after which they switch to full free riding. For the HI condition, we show k to be 
increasing in the proportion p of conditional cooperators and in the mpcr.  For our finitely repeated 
super-games of 10 periods, it is self-evident that for any 0 < p < 1 and any mpcr < 1, k ≤ 9.  If all 
14 
 
players have identical beliefs and degrees of strategic sophistication, then all payoff-maximisers 
interacting at given mpcr and information condition will adopt identical strategies, and their 
behaviours and those of the conditional cooperators will be indistinguishable up to period k, 
providing no basis for choosing one partner over another.
8
  In practice, however, individuals‘ 
contributions are likely to differ from one another, due inter alia to different beliefs about p and 
different levels of strategic sophistication.  This differentiation will lead to meaningful partner 
preferences and to a significant impact of the partner assignment mechanism, including the 
tendency for individuals having closely similar contribution profiles to be paired.
 9
 
Both a selfishly rational individual and a conditional cooperator, who also gets positive 
utility from own earnings, will prefer to interact with more cooperative partners. We thus expect to 
see rankings consistent with a preference for more cooperative partners, and we expect the 
workings of our ranking mechanism to cause higher contributors to be matched with one another.
10
  
Since subjects in the MI and HI treatments see a sample of others‘ average contributions thus far in 
the ranking stage, beginning with a phase‘s second period, and since those subjects are also shown 
in the contribution stages the past average contribution of the partner who gets assigned to them, 
they can infer whether they are lately playing with relatively high contributors, relatively low ones, 
                                                          
8
 In period k + 1, the payoff-maximisers would at last distinguish themselves from the conditional cooperators, after 
which conditional cooperators will be able to favour one another as partners in period k + 2 and beyond (assuming 
additional periods remain, i.e. assuming k ≤ 8).   
9
 The basic version of our model considers a selfish player who calculates the optimal number of periods to mimic 
cooperation under the assumption that only actual conditional cooperators reciprocate their contributions.  The 
alternative assumption that all rational selfish players will mimic cooperation for so long as this is profitable would 
predict a somewhat higher k.  Probably neither approach is fully realistic, because individuals differ in their degrees of 
strategic sophistication, causing the degree to which cooperation is mimicked to vary not only with own but also with 
beliefs regarding others‘ degrees of sophistication.  Our model‘s qualitative conclusions should hold for a range of 
such adjustments.   
10
 To be sure, our ranking and grouping procedure can give rise to strategic issues, because once subjects have 
differentiated themselves with respect to contributions, an individual who is only the second or third highest 
contributor in his sub-set of five has reason not to give his most preferred rank to the highest contributor in the 
complementary sub-set.  In Section 3, we nonetheless report both a highly significant correlation between rank 
assignment and past average contribution of the subject being ranked, and we find that the mechanism is quite 
effective in pairing partners of similar contribution.  
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or ones in between. Most subjects are accordingly likely to infer, by the end of the first phase, that 
contributing more increases one‘s chance of interacting with a high-contributing partner.  If the 
expected impact of the extra point one contributes to the joint account on the contribution of the 
future partners whose identity is influenced by this decision is high enough, it is profitable to 
contribute more, despite an mpcr < 1.  Simplifying by considering only that return from this 
period‘s investment in reputation which is realised in the period immediately following, we see 
that to compensate for each extra point contributed, a subject would need to anticipate an extra 
contribution ∂Cj by the next partner per additional point of own contribution such that mpcr∙∂Cj ≥ 
(1 – mpcr).  For mpcr = 0.85 (HG treatments), the requirement is ∂Cj,t+1/∂Ci,t ≥ (1 - .85)/.85 ≈ .176, 
while for mpcr = 0.65 (LG treatments), it is ∂Cj,t+1/∂Ci,t ≥ (1 - .65)/.65 ≈ .538.  The much higher 
hurdle for the LG treatments provides intuition for the prediction above that contributions are less 
sustainable with the lower mpcr.  
The Appendix provides a more complete accounting, also considering benefits from 
potentially higher contributions by partners in periods beyond t + 1. Using this more 
comprehensive approach, we confirm that the number of periods of cooperation k that optimises 
earnings in HG treatments (mpcr 0.85) is higher than that in LG treatments (mpcr 0.65) assuming 
the same known proportion p of conditional cooperators. If p is independent of mpcr, this leads to: 
PREDICTION 1. Contributions will be more sustained in the HI-HG than in the HI-LG treatment.  
The predictions in our Appendix are most directly applicable to our high information 
treatments. What of the other information conditions?  Consider first those on the opposite end of 
the information spectrum.  In all of our treatments, subjects maintain fixed IDs during a phase, but 
in the LI treatments only their counterpart of a given period learns their action, and there is no way 
for reputations to spread within the set.  A subject might still attempt to build a within-phase 
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reputation for cooperativeness with specific individuals, as do counterparts in Andreoni and Miller 
(1993), who found considerable, indeed growing, cooperation during the early periods of their 
finitely-repeated games.  Such reputation building would be complicated for our subjects by the 
random selection of the potential partner sub-set each period, which makes a single pairing 
unlikely to be sustainable without interruptions.  For this reason, we may see at least some subjects 
attempting to build cooperative relationships with more than one other in a given phase.  And 
despite the difficulty of maintaining ongoing relationships in all treatments, it seems likely that 
given pairs of subjects will play more periods of a phase with one another in the LI than in the MI 
and HI treatments, since in the former prior play with an individual is the only way to ascertain 
cooperativeness.  
While sparseness of information will cause more rank numbers to be assigned randomly in 
the LI treatments, subjects will still preferentially rank whatever past partner had been most 
cooperative, and the converse for those who free rode, so the ranking and partner assignment 
mechanism can still be used to similar qualitative effect.  But with reputation so much more 
difficult to build, we conjecture that cooperation will be greater on average with high information, 
even with low return to cooperation, than with low information, even with high return. 
PREDICTION 2. Contributions will be higher in the HI-LG treatment than in the LI-HG treatment 
(completeness of information will trump size of potential cooperative gain). 
 In MI treatments, a given contribution choice has only half the chance of preserving or 
improving one‘s reputation, if high, and harming it, if low, as compared to HI treatments.  The 
impression of a ―mid-way‖ position between the other two information conditions seems likely to 
be misleading, however.  Since there‘s no way to know in advance which choices will affect one‘s 
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reputation with others besides the current partner, and since those choices that are recorded and 
reported will have about twice the weight on reputation as choices in the HI treatments, investment 
in reputation is likely to be more similar to that in the HI than that in the LI treatments.  The effects 
of the differences in mcpr remain the same, and potentially strong enough that we cannot 
confidently predict the relationship between contributions in the HI-LG and those in the MI-HG 
treatment.  Letting C stand for average contribution, what can be predicted is:   
PREDICTION 3. C(HI-HG) > C(MI-HG) > C(LI-HG); C(HI-LG) > C(MI-LG) > C(LI-LG) (i.e., 
for given return from cooperation, contributions are ordered according to the completeness of 
within-phase reputational information). 
The reasoning discussed also supports the generalization of Prediction 1 as: 
PREDICTION 4. C(HI-HG) > C(HI-LG); C(MI-HG) > C(MI-LG); and C(LI-HG) > C(LI-LG) 
(i.e., for given completeness of reputational information, contributions will be higher the higher is 
the return from cooperation).   
Between-phase dynamics 
 Thus far, we‘ve considered change over time within a single phase only.  By assuming a 
mixed population of conditional cooperators and payoff-maximisers, where 0 < p < 1, our simple 
model in which payoff-maximisers contribute at the same level as conditional cooperators from 
periods 1 to k, thereafter contributing 0, implies that there will be a drop in average contribution in 
the final period or periods of the phase.  Even if there is a well-known value of p for the universe 
of individuals from whom the subject set is drawn, p can vary between randomly drawn sets of 
subjects, so it is likely that play of the second phase will differ from that of the first due to updated 
beliefs about p leading to new optimal k.  Given the details of our design, subjects will be better 
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informed of p  after a phase of play the smaller is k and the higher the information condition (HI > 
MI > LI).
11
   
 Actual subjects are likely to differ in their degree of strategic sophistication, as well as in 
their guesses regarding the degrees of such sophistication among fellow subjects, which means that 
there is scope for learning from earlier experience additional to revising estimates of p.  As 
mentioned earlier, some subjects may not have appreciated the potential benefits of establishing 
cooperative reputations at the outset, and since they are able to wipe their reputational slates clean 
only when one phase ends and another begins, a rise in their appraisal of those benefits may have a 
larger impact on their play at the outset of the next phase than in the remainder of the first one.  
Under conditions which make benefits of cooperation small, however, some subjects may lower 
their appraisals of cooperation‘s benefits and contribute less when the next phase begins.   While 
unable to make exact predictions, an increase in cooperation across phases appears less likely the 
poorer is information and the lower the potential cooperative gain, since the benefits of behaving 
cooperatively will be smaller under those conditions. 
 With regard to end-game learning, it is worth pointing out first that if subjects were all 
strategically sophisticated and either of conditional cooperator or payoff-maximiser type, with 0 < 
p < 1, then there would be no theoretical reason to predict that observing the decline in 
contributions toward the end of the first phase would lead to earlier rather than to later unravelling 
of cooperation.  Those payoff-maximisers whose expectations had proven over-optimistic might 
reduce their k‘s, but just as many might have been overly pessimistic and thus have reason to 
                                                          
11
 If end-game behaviour appears in period 10 only, subjects‘ exposure to it is quite limited. Note also that a shift to 
non-contribution is not an unambiguous indicator that past cooperation was feigned, since even a conditional 
cooperator will refrain from contributing if convinced that her counterpart will not contribute. 
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revise those estimates of p and therefore their calculation of k upwards.
12
  Once subjects achieve 
stable estimates of p, k should also remain fixed, paralleling the ―settling into a stable pattern‖ 
dynamics found by Andreoni and Miller (1993). 
 The presence of less sophisticated subjects whose understanding of the game improves 
with experience, however, might lead to a tendency for cooperation to unravel earlier with each 
phase.  These subjects might not be able to solve for an optimal behaviour assuming a distribution 
of types; rather, they might look for an ―appropriate‖ behaviour that seems not too far from the 
norm, while at the same time seeking to avoid being taken advantage of.  Their first experience of 
end-game behaviours may come as a ―wake up call,‖ and their impulse afterwards may be to try to 
defect one period ahead of others, in the future.   
 We end by noting that increases in reputation-building behaviours in early periods, and 
earlier end-game declines, are not mutually incompatible. Given some initially unsophisticated 
subjects having an ability to learn from experience, it is possible that both some learning that it can 
pay to establish a cooperative reputation, and a tendency to try to stay a step ahead of others‘ end-
game behaviours, may be present when the conditions for reputation building are sufficiently 
favourable.              
3. Results 
 12 experiment sessions, two for each treatment, each with 20 subjects, were conducted at a 
computer classroom at Brown University from October 2012 through March 2013.  Adding one 
                                                          
12
 The Appendix, which simplifies by assuming that p is common knowledge, shows that the privately optimal k of a 
payoff-maximiser remains fixed over a range of p values because k is confined to the integers, so not all changes in p 
are associated with changes in k. 
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under-populated session of 10 subjects, this makes for a total of 250 subjects.
13
  The experiment 
was programmed using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Participants were undergraduates drawn from 
all subject areas, recruited through the BUSSEL (Brown University Social Science Experiment 
Lab) registration site.
14
  All lacked prior experience in VCM experiments. Sessions lasted between 
ninety minutes and two hours. Instructions were neutrally framed and were read aloud by one of 
the experimenters as subjects read along.
15
 Subjects then answered comprehension questions and 
were invited to ask questions which were answered by a member of the experiment team before 
the start of decision-making.  
 A first view of the impacts of our treatments on contribution trends is provided by Figure 1.  
We see that in all treatments, average contributions in each phase are positive but ultimately 
decreasing within each phase, as in conventional finitely repeated VCM experiments.  Between 
information levels, average contributions tend to be highest in HI, lowest in LI, and intermediate 
(although usually closer to HI than to LI) in MI condition, consistent with Prediction 3. At a given 
information level, average contributions appear to be higher in the high (HG) than in the 
corresponding low gain (LG) treatment, consistent with Prediction 4.  Our Prediction 2 conjecture 
that information would trump returns (C(HI-LG) > C(LI-HG)) holds true in the early periods of 
later phases, but not overall. 
[Figure 1] 
                                                          
13
 By ―under-populated,‖ we refer to one session of the MI-HG treatment that had insufficient turnout and thus 
proceeded with only 10 subjects (one set).  An extra session with two subject sets was therefore added for that 
treatment.  Because the data from the under-populated session show no systematic differences from the others of its 
treatment, we keep all 5 set-level observations of it (Table 1). 
14
 The university offers a wide range of science, engineering and mathematics, social science and humanities majors.  
Slightly under 17% of participants reported economics as their major or one of their major fields, almost identical to 
its representation among Brown undergraduates at the time.  56% of subjects were female, slightly above the 53% 
share of female undergraduates at the university. 
15
 Full instructions are available online on the journal website. 
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In conditions with medium or high information, within-phase downward trends are 
noticeably more attenuated in the first six to eight periods of a phase in high gains treatments  (MI-
HG and HI-HG) than in the corresponding low gain treatments (MI-LG and HI-LG), supporting 
Prediction 1.  The rapid decay of contributions in the latter treatments causes our Prediction 2 
conjecture that information would trump returns (C(HI-LG) > C(LI-HG)), which hold in some 
early periods of phases, to fail overall (Table 1). As for between-phase changes, the initial 
contribution of a phase tends to rise from phase to phase in at least one MI and in both HI 
treatments, as detailed below.  These results suggest that incentives to invest in a reputation for 
cooperativeness became stronger with repetition in all treatments with an adequate basis for 
reputation formation, but their effectiveness within each phase decayed more rapidly for the 
smaller mpcr, as predicted by our theoretical analysis.  Finally, there are visual indications that 
end-game ―unravelling‖ began earlier in late than in early phases, a matter to which we return 
shortly. 
3.1 Change across Phases: Increasing Investments in Reputation, Earlier Unraveling of 
Cooperation     
 The main innovation of our design is that it allows us to study what happens to the impact 
of potential competition for partners when more than one finitely repeated game is played.  We 
speculated that subjects might on average learn to try even harder to invest in cooperative 
reputations in early periods of later phases, but that their experience of end game effects in early 
phases might lead to earlier ―unraveling‖ of cooperation.  Figure 1 suggests that both effects were 
present to some degree in at least some treatments with substantial possibility of investing in 
reputation.  Although contributions in the low gain treatments decay rapidly with repetition within 
phase, the average contribution in periods 11, 21 and 31 appear to be slightly higher than the 
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average in period 1 for the MI-LG treatment, and the average appears to rise substantially from 
period 1 to period 11 and from period 11 to periods 21 and 31 (with the latter not much different 
from each other) in the HI-LG treatment.  Despite their different within-phase trends, something 
similar applies to the initial periods of phases in both the MI-HG and the HI-HG treatments.  Non-
parametric tests looking at the first period of phase only find some of these differences to be 
statistically significant.
16
 
 To consider more than first periods only, we look for differences in the contribution level at 
which the trends of different phases begin by estimating for each treatment a multivariate 
regression using set-level observations. These regressions, which assume that contributions vary if 
at all with a linear trend of common slope for the first seven periods of any phase, and with a 
possibly different linear trend for the last three periods of the phase, are shown in Table 2.  
Significant differences in the phase dummy variables indicate whether contributions were 
significantly higher or lower in later phases. The estimates indicate that contributions are 
significantly lower in the second than in the first phase in the two LI treatments, and in the third 
than in the second phase in one of those two (the LI-HG treatment), with little difference between 
third and fourth phase.  The MI-LG treatment shows almost no trends in contributions across the 
phases.  Contrastingly, the HI-LG and MI-HG treatments show contributions to be increasing 
significantly from phase one to two and two to three, with a further increase phase 4 in HI-LG.  
Thus, the visual impression that the contribution trends begin at higher levels in later than in earlier 
phases is supported statistically by the estimated intercepts of the linear regression trends for two 
of our treatments.  In a third treatment, HI-HG, the visual impression in Figure 1 that contributions 
                                                          
16
  Using as observations only their set-level averages, and thus having only four or five pairs of observations for each 
test, we find that the average contribution is higher in period 31 than in period 1, significant at the 10% level, in the 
MI-LG and HI-LG treatments according to Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. The corresponding differences are significant 
at the 5% level in the MI-HG treatment. Detailed results are found in Panel (2) of Appendix Table B1. 
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rise in phases 2, 3 and 4 is supported by the point estimates of the phase dummy coefficients in 
Table 2, but those coefficients fall short of statistical significance, in part because contributions are 
already so high in phase 1. A simpler specification using set level observations of average 
contribution in periods 1 – 7 of each phase and including only a trend variable for phase number, 
attains a positive coefficient significant at the 5% level (see Appendix Table B3), so a statistically 
significant upward trend is confirmed at the subject set level.  These findings for treatments HI-LG, 
MI-HG and HI-HG suggest that at least some subjects took from their early experiences the idea 
that they could do better by investing more in the early periods of a phase than they had initially 
done. These findings are consistent with the predictions discussed in Section 2.2.
17
  
Result 1: The average contribution was significantly lower in phases 2, 3 and 4 than in Phase 1 in 
the two LI treatments.  By contrast, it was significantly higher in the later than in the earlier 
phases in the two HI treatments and in the MI-HG treatment. With good information and high 
return from cooperation, subjects decide to invest in more cooperative reputations after their 
slates are exogenously wiped clean, despite end-game observations.  
 As mentioned, Figure 1 also gives the impression of earlier end-game unravelling of 
contributions in later than in earlier phases in the two treatments (MI-HG and HI-HG) in which 
contributions are relatively sustained in the early periods of each phase.  We use two approaches to 
investigate whether subjects were deciding to ―free ride‖ significantly earlier as the experiment 
progressed. 
                                                          
17
  The value of average contribution by treatment and phase is reported in Appendix Table B1, which also reports 
Wilcoxon tests for significance of differences at the set and individual levels.  Average contribution over ten periods 
rises from 2.92 (Phase 1) to 3.63 (Phase 2) to 4.19 (Phase 3) to 4.68 (Phase 4) in HI-LG treatment, for example.  For 
that treatment, most phase-to-phase differences are statistically significant at the 5% level or better in individual level 
tests.  The regressions in Appendix Table B3 also provide support for the finding of rising contributions in treatments 
HI-LG and MI-HG. 
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 First, for each subject in each treatment and phase, we identify the last period of the phase 
in which he or she chose Ci > 0.  Table 3 shows both the mean and the median across subjects 
within each treatment of this last period of phase in which a positive contribution is made, phase 
by phase.  For each treatment, the average and median period of last positive contribution becomes 
earlier as one moves from phase to phase, with the only exception occurring between phases 2 and 
3 in the MI-HG treatment.
18
   
Result 2: Median and especially average periods of last positive contribution are found to have 
come earlier as sets of subjects moved from phase to phase in all six treatments.   
 Second, we look at the number of subjects making positive contributions in the final period 
of each phase.  Barring confusion, only true conditional cooperators or possessors of other non-
standard preferences should contribute anything in these periods, and the number contributing can 
be taken as a lower bound on the number with such preferences (recall that a true conditional 
cooperator will contribute 0 if believing her counterpart will do the same). As discussed in Section 
2, the existence of conditional cooperators, and subjects‘ first- and higher-order beliefs about their 
representation in the subject pool, may be critical to giving selfish subjects an incentive to invest in 
cooperative reputations. Figure 2 graphs the percentage of subjects contributing Ci > 0 in a phase‘s 
last period by treatment (each of six lettered sub-figures) and phase (bars within sub-figures).  We 
see that within each treatment, the proportion making a positive contribution in the last period 
steadily declines from phase to phase, a trend that may be readily explained by decreasing 
optimism about others‘ last period contributions based on experience both within the current phase 
and in previous ones. Between treatments, the main difference is that the share contributing a 
                                                          
18
 Interestingly, positive contributions were the norm in the 9
th
 periods of all but the fourth phase in the LI-HG and MI-
HG treatments, and in the 9
th
 period of all phases in the HI-HG treatment. There are slightly earlier switches to 
complete free-riding in the MI-LG and HI-LG treatments and a much earlier switch—after period 4—in the LI-LG 
treatment.  
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positive amount in the initial period 10 is somewhat higher in each HG than in each LG treatment 
and that, among HG treatments, the share appears higher in the MI-HG than the LI-HG and higher 
in the HI-HG than in the MI-HG treatment.  In each case, higher last period contributions are 
consistent with higher estimates of the likelihood that counterparts are true conditional cooperators, 
in turn consistent with more evidence of cooperation within the initial phase.
19,20
  
3.2 Ranking, Payoff to Reputation, and Partnerships 
      The desire to obtain cooperative partners can potentially explain high positive contributions 
in the early periods of a phase in our experiment.  In this subsection, we look more closely at how 
the ranking and partner assignment mechanisms worked, then calculate the actual payoffs from 
cooperation in each treatment.  To check that subjects expressed a preference for higher-
contributing partners, we estimated individual random effects Tobit regressions in which the rank 
number assigned by each subject to each potential partner is predicted by the latter‘s past average 
contribution in the phase (HI treatments) or by the selected past average and the share of available 
past periods randomly selected for inclusion (MI treatments).  We obtain highly significant 
negative coefficients on all variables, indicating that subjects, as expected, tended to give better 
(lower) rank numbers to those thus far reported to have contributed more on average to their joint 
accounts, and that in the MI treatments subjects also showed a preference for counterparts 
                                                          
19
 Hypothetically, one could form inferences about p from Figure 2 and use them to compute optimal k for a payoff-
maximiser as indicated by Appendix Table A.1.  There is some rough alignment of behaviours with the resulting 
predictions.  Recall, however, that the impact of behaviour in the very last period of a phase is probably much smaller 
than it would be with fuller information, because each subject in our treatments saw feedback of his or her own 
partner‘s behaviour in that period only.   
20
 As mentioned earlier, Charness and Yang (2010)‘s experiment also includes a complete restart of a finitely repeated 
super-game with endogenous group formation, so comparing what they find with regard to changes in reputational 
investment and end-game behaviour is of interest.  Their Figure 1 suggests that as in our MI-HG and HI-HG 
treatments, subjects in their two endogenous grouping treatments contributed more in the earlier periods of their 
second than those of their first super-game and that the end-game effect in the second super-game was more 
pronounced than that in the first.   
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information about whom was more complete.
21
 For the LI treatments, in which subjects could 
know the past contributions of others only for those periods of the phase in which they had been 
paired together, we separately estimated regressions that show that there, too, subjects gave 
significantly better ranks to others based on their information about their contribution tendencies, 
in the LI-HG treatment also showing a preference for individuals with whom they had interacted 
for more previous periods, other things being equal.
22
   
Result 3: In the MI and HI treatments, subjects were more likely to give better rank numbers to 
those who were reported to have contributed more in the past. In the LI treatments, subjects were 
more likely to give better rank numbers to those perceived to be higher contributors based on 
direct past interactions. In the MI treatments (the LI-HG treatment), subjects preferred to be 
matched with others whose history information was more complete (whose behaviour was better 
known to the rank-giver by virtue of more interaction). 
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 The regressions are shown in Appendix Table B7.  In additional analysis, not shown, we confirm that there was 
significant variation in the proportion of periods randomly selected for display in the two MI treatments; about two-
thirds of subjects had 4, 5 or 6 of the previous 9 periods‘ decisions displayed as of the tenth period of a phase, leaving 
considerable numbers who had fewer or more periods selected. Because strategic concern about inability to compete 
for highest-contributing counterparts might have influenced ranks given, we also estimated Probit regressions in which 
not giving one‘s best rank to the highest past contributor among available prospective counterparts is explained by 
one‘s own relative contribution standing and phase dummies.  Lower relative standing does indeed significantly raise 
the likelihood of not giving the highest contributor one‘s best rank (see Appendix Table B8). However, such strategic 
voting is clearly of second-order importance, because for example we are unable to pick up its presence by adding 
controls to regression formats resembling that of Appendix Table B7.   
22
 For the regressions for the LI treatments, shown in Appendix Table B9, we created a ―perceived previous average 
contribution‖ variable that takes the value of each group member‘s average past contribution during interactions with 
oneself, if the two have interacted in the phase, or else the median value among those one has thus far interacted with, 
if the assessor has not played with the assessed individual.  This ―perceived previous average contribution‖ variable 
obtains negative coefficients significant at the 1% level.  For the regressions of both tables B.7 and B.9, we also 
checked whether qualitatively different results obtain if, rather than past average contribution of the subjects being 
ranked, we use that subject‘s own past contribution relative to the average past contribution of others in the 
prospective partner sub-set.  These robustness tests yield qualitatively identical results.  The minor exception is that the 
variable reflecting a preference to play again with counterparts one has interacted with more in past periods of the 
phase becomes statistically significant in the regression for the LI-LG treatment corresponding to column (1) of Table 
B9.   
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 To be effective in generating incentives to contribute, the partner assignment mechanism 
should also reliably assign high contributing subjects to interact with one another, preventing low 
contributors from accessing these preferred partners.  The more highly correlated are the 
contribution levels of those paired together, then, the more effectively is the mechanism aiding 
incentive generation.  To check for this, we identified for each subject and period (except the first 
period of each phase, for which no information on past play was available) (a) the rank of each 
individual within their five-person matching subset based on their full contribution history in the 
phase thus far, and (b) in the LI and MI treatments, ―perceived ranks‖ within matching subsets 
based on recorded history (MI) or own interaction history (LI) only.  We then calculated Pearson‘s 
bivariate correlation coefficients for each period and treatment based on both the objective history 
and the perceived history approaches. In the high information treatments, for which the perceived 
and objective approaches are the same, correlations are positive and in every period significant at 
least at the 5% and usually at the 1% level.  In the medium information treatments, correlations 
using either approach are almost always positive and are significant in 82% of periods, mostly at 
the 1% level.  In the low information treatments, there is some successful matching, with at least 
marginally significantly positive correlations using objective history (method (a)) in a little under 
half (44.4%) of testable periods.  Results are shown in Appendix Tables B.10 and B.11.   
As a further check on the mechanism‘s success in pairing like contributors, we also 
estimated two regressions for each treatment, with individual random effects, in which the average 
past contribution of each subject i in each period t is dependent variable and the average past 
contribution of i‘s period t partner is the only explanatory variable.  All coefficients are positive 
and significant at the 1% level, indicating that on average like was paired with like in all six 
treatments, although there are differences in the magnitudes of the coefficients suggesting 
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differences in accuracy of pairings.  Overall, the tightest correlations between own and partner‘s 
past contributions, with coefficients around 0.5, are achieved when there is fuller information on 
which ranking can be based, with greater incentive to carefully rank perhaps contributing to the 
tighter correlation in the MI-HG than in the MI-LG treatment.
23
  
Result 4: The ranking procedure sorted subjects and paired those with cooperative history with 
similarly cooperative subjects, those with less cooperative history with similarly less cooperative 
subjects. Its functioning was most effective in the HI treatments and least effective in the LI 
treatments. 
 Ultimately, what matters to the mechanism‘s success at encouraging cooperation is not the 
past behaviours of those you are matched with but how they behave when you interact with them.  
We use our data to estimate the impact of own contribution on the contribution of future partners, 
partners whose identities (not only their contributions) might well be influenced by what one 
decides to contribute now.  In Table 4, we report individual fixed effect regression estimates of the 
marginal impact of own period t contribution on counterpart‘s period t + 1 contribution, controlling 
(when possible) for own average contribution (in MI treatments, reported average contribution) in 
earlier periods (1 to t – 1) of the phase.  The regressions are reported only for the MI and HI 
treatments, in which a reputation with third parties can be built via reporting to a set of potential 
counterparts.  We report separately estimates for period 1 of a phase, for which there are no prior 
recorded contributions, and for periods 2 through 7, in which the prior contribution average can be 
controlled for, leaving out effects on the final two periods t + 1, in which end-game effects are 
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 There is also some indication that stronger incentives to pay attention to partner quality leads to tighter correlations, 
e.g. in the MI-HG than in the MI-LG treatment. See Appendix Table B12 parts I(a) and I(b), which report regressions 
and tests for significance of coefficient differences when all past contributions are considered.  Alternative 
specifications in which only the information the prospective partners could take into account about one another are 
considered are shown in later parts of Table B12 and show significant and in some cases somewhat higher correlations.   
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important, since we are especially interested in the incentive to invest in reputation in early 
periods.
24
   
All estimated coefficients suggest that contributing an additional point this period raises 
one‘s (possibly new) counterpart‘s contribution next period, significant at the 1% or 5% levels, 
with the exception of the regression for period 1 of the HI-LG treatment.  Point estimates are 
higher for period 1, but the significance of the estimates for the later periods is perhaps more 
impressive, since, in view of the control, these are truly marginal impacts of contributing in period 
t, taking already-established reputation as given.  Recall that it would be selfishly rational to 
contribute an additional point now at a sacrifice of (1 – mpcr) points if the impact on the next 
counterpart‘s contribution (remembering that the identity of the counterpart is itself not yet 
determined) is an increase of at least ((1 – mpcr)/mpcr) points.  This implies that the value of 
∂Cj,t+1/∂Ci,t, estimated by the first coefficient in Table 4, must be at least (1 –  0.85)/0.85 ≈ 0.176 in 
the HG treatments and at least (1 – 0.65)/0.65 ≈ 0.538 in the LG treatments in order to spur a 
contribution from a strictly self-interested subject who myopically considers the next period only.  
The estimated coefficients in the regressions for the LG treatments are not dramatically different 
from those for the HG treatments, but since most are not far above the first cut-off value (.176), the 
required threshold for privately recuperating one‘s cost of contributing in a single period is clearly 
met by the HG treatments (columns (5) – (9)) only.   
 Properly speaking, a non-myopic payoff-maximiser in LG condition should ask whether 
foregoing 0.35 points now can be made up by the expected additional contributions of future 
partners that total more than 0.538 points over all remaining periods of the phase.  To the estimate 
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 Note that we include own contribution in period 7 and next counterpart‘s contribution in period 8 of each phase; thus, 
our way of excluding the most pronounced end-game behaviours causes us to drop only two of the periods of potential 
effects that could have been included. 
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of the impact in period t + 1 given above, the far-sighted decision-maker would add impacts by 
way of the averaging of the period t contribution into the displayed past average contribution in 
periods t + 2, t + 3, etc., multiplied by the impact of each point of average contribution on later 
partners‘ contributions measured by the second coefficient of the columns (2) or (6) estimate in 
Table 4.  By such a calculation, contributing one‘s full endowment in period 1 is clearly profitable, 
since it returns 1.18 points, in the MI-LG treatment.
25
   However, the estimated total additional 
contributions by future partners diminish as the phase proceeds: to 0.70 per point contributed in 
period 2, and to less than the 0.538 threshold, or specifically 0.51 per point contributed in period 3, 
0.38 in period 4, and 0.29, in period 5.  Parallel calculations using the corresponding Table 4 
regression coefficients show contributing to be selfishly rational with considerably larger margins 
of gain and for a larger share of the phase‘s periods, in the HI treatments.  Since subjects could not 
have perfectly estimated the impacts of their decisions, a combination of myopia, uncertainty, and 
risk aversion would be sufficient to explain why contributions fall off rapidly in each period of the 
phase following the first, in the LG treatments, whereas the much higher ―profit margins‖ for early 
period contributions in HG treatments support more sustained contributions within each phase. 
Result 5: The benefit of contributing in terms of future partners’ contributions exceeded the cost 
within a single period in the HG but not in the LG treatments. The total benefits of contributing, 
considering all remaining periods, exceeded the cost in the earlier but not the later periods of the 
LG treatments. 
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 The calculation considers that if t = 1, each point contributed in t affects past average contribution (in expectation, 
for MI treatments) by ½ in period 3, by 1/3 in period 4, by ¼ in period 5, and so on.  Using only the coefficients in 
Table 4‘s estimates and assuming no further benefits in periods 9 and 10, the gain per point contributed in period 1 of 
the MI-LG treatment is thus   0.25 + 0.38 * (1) + 0.38 * (1/2) + 0.38 * (1/3) + 0.38 * (1/4) + 0.38 * (1/5) + 0.38 * (1/6) 
≈ 1.18, where the two numbers (i.e., values) shown in bold typeface are those from our regression estimates. 
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It is interesting, finally, to see whether partners successfully built reputations with one 
another in the LI treatments, where there is no way to build a reputation with set members one has 
not interacted with.  In these treatments, Figure 1 shows the average rates of decline of 
contributions to be relatively mild in both periods 1 – 7 and periods 8 – 10 of each phase, due in 
part to the fact that the average contributions in earlier periods were already low. A close look at 
the data, however, shows that a few subjects were able to form successful partnerships with 
specific others for as many as 5 and in the limit up to 9 periods within a phase. Strikingly, the 
average earnings of pairs, shown in Panel (1) of Appendix Table B14, increase as the duration of 
pairing in a phase lengthens. Distinguishing between subjects‘ longest and shortest partnerships 
and performing Wilcoxon matched pair tests, we find that subjects earned significantly more on 
average during their longer than during their shorter partnerships in phases 2 to 4 in the LI-LG 
treatment and in all four phases in the LI-HG treatment.
26
        
Result 6: Some subject pairs managed to build successful partnerships in the LI treatments, despite 
the random interruptions built into the design.  LI treatment subjects’ long-duration partnerships 
were significantly more profitable than their partnerships having short durations. 
3.3 Contributions and Trends within Phases  
 The average contribution patterns in the initial phase reconfirm three of the most standard 
findings of the literature: (1) average contributions begin at around half of the endowment (with 
considerable variation among individuals), (2) the average contribution tends to decline with 
                                                          
26
 See Appendix Table B14 and our working paper, for details. Note that causality may run in both directions; that is, 
subjects would have given better ranks to partners who had been more cooperative, which helps lengthen duration, and 
subjects would have had reason to be more cooperative towards partners with whom they had hopes of playing for 
more future periods. 
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repetition, and (3) contributions are larger at a higher than at a lower mpcr.
27
  Initial contributions 
cluster between 37 and 49% of endowment in the LG treatments and between 63 and 77% of 
endowment in the HG treatments.  The only noteworthy sign that the endogenous partner 
assignment and reputation dimensions of the experiment might be altering matters qualitatively is 
that the average contribution graph of the HI-HG treatment shows little sign of decline in 
contributions between periods 1 and 9, a pattern that remains for early periods in later phases of 
that treatment and in some phases of the MI-HG treatment as well.  
 To obtain a more precise sense of the tendency of contributions to change within a phase, 
we can return to the regressions of Table 2.  The coefficients for the period 1 – 7 (of phase) and 
period 8 – 10 (of phase) trend variables indicate statistically significant downward contribution 
trends in every treatment and in both early and late periods of phases.  As suspected, however, the 
rate of decline tends to be considerably greater in periods 8 – 10 than in periods 1 – 7 in the MI-
HG and HI-HG treatments, with a slope almost twice and three times, respectively, steeper for the 
later than for the earlier periods in the latter treatment, and with the slope differences between 
early and later periods being statistically significant for both treatments.  Rates of decline also 
show significant between-treatment differences for periods 1 – 7 when comparing the MI-LG to 
the MI-HG treatment, and when comparing the HI-LG to the HI-HG treatment, supporting 
Prediction 1.
28
 
Result 7: The average contribution followed a declining trend within phases in each of the six 
treatments. The rate of decline was significantly milder in periods 1 – 7 than in periods 8 – 10 in 
the high gain treatments with medium and high information. Also, the rate of decline in periods 1 – 
                                                          
27
 These three themes are already present, for example, in Davis and Holt‘s (1993) survey of the early literature.  See 
also Ledyard (1995) and Zelmer (2003).   
28
  See the two-side F tests in Appendix Table B2. 
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7 was significantly milder with high than with low gain in both the medium and high information 
treatment pairs. 
3.4 Prevalence of Conditional Cooperation  
 It is relevant to ask, finally, how consistent our data are with previous indications of the 
prevalence of conditional cooperation. To answer, we must first decide what inferences our data 
themselves support.  Some may argue that subjects are initially naïve about the benefit of last 
period free-riding, learn that it is beneficial in the course of play, and that the 10 to 20% shares 
observed in period 40 are thus better indicators of true conditional cooperation than the 
observations from other periods.  An opposite view is that the greater part of the drop-off in final 
contributing should be attributed to declining optimism about others‘ actions.  After all, our 
instructions were clear and included tables showing own and partner‘s earnings for all possible 
contribution pairs,  subjects had to answer control questions, and individuals of above-average 
intelligence are over-represented in our subject pool.  In the treatment and phase in which subjects 
had most reason to be optimistic about counterparts‘ contributions, phase 1 of the HI-HG treatment, 
about 58% of subjects contributed a positive amount in the phase‘s last period.29  This does not 
differ markedly from estimates of the share of conditionally cooperative individuals in the subject 
pools of Fischbacher et al. (2001), Keser and van Winden (2006), Herrmann and Thöni (2009), 
Kocher et al. (2010) and Kamei (2011).  It also closely resembles the estimated share of 
cooperators based on the endogenous grouping treatment in Page et al. (2005), 59%.        
4. Conclusions 
                                                          
29
 Since subjects are randomly drawn from the same subject pool, it is unlikely that the true p differs much between the 
subjects in different treatments and likely that the better part of the differences apparent in Figure 2 are attributable to 
differences in treatment parameters, not in p.   
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 The desire to be a reputable partner in a world in which people get to decide who they 
interact with is a probable cause of much observed cooperation.  Relevant real life situations are 
sometimes better captured by infinite repetition, sometimes by finite repetition models.  Games of 
finite repetition are of particular interest to experimentalists and theorists because evidence of 
social preferences is in principal clearer in them. Even in interactions involving finite repetition, 
however, people may get to start over, for instance when they move or change careers.  To see how 
experience of a finitely repeated social dilemma with partner choice might affect play in 
subsequent interactions of the same kind, we studied experimentally how subjects‘ experiences 
would impact play in later finitely-repeated games.   
 We found that when the benefit of mutually cooperating is high relative to the earnings 
foregone by not free riding, and when the informational conditions for acquiring a reputation 
within a population of potential partners are favourable, relatively high levels of cooperation were 
sustained during most periods. With respect to learning across super-games, we found that 
cooperation became stronger in later games.  This suggests that subjects updated their beliefs about 
the returns to cooperating—a return from attracting more cooperative partners which we showed to 
be large and significant—in the direction of increased optimism.   
Although early-in-phase cooperation grew over time especially in the high gain treatments 
with good information, end-game associated declines began earlier in each phase than in the 
previous one, raising the possibility that with enough repetition, ―learning the benefits of 
cooperation‖ might eventually be overwhelmed by ―backward unravelling.‖  Our 40 period, four 
(finitely repeated) super-game experiment may be too short to draw definite conclusions on this, 
however.   
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While reconfirming that competition for partners can be a spur to cooperation, our paper‘s 
main contribution lies in demonstrating for the first time that learning that cooperating pays and 
learning to anticipate end-game behaviours can both be present when a finitely repeated social 
dilemma game with partner choice is exogenously restarted.  Insofar as the first factor dominates, 
these results suggest that when designing real world institutions, it may in some instances be 
desirable that occasions exist on which the reputational slates of individuals are cleaned, so that 
past learning about the benefits of a good reputation can translate more effectively into future 
cooperation.  While making reputation cleaning too easy for individuals to implement at their own 
discretion may be fraught with dangers, as other studies have shown, the more favourable 
outcomes illustrated in our experiment with exogenous restarts of reputation accumulation suggest 
a partial explanation of how cultures of cooperation have been sustained or even strengthened in 
some societies despite the increasing mobility of modern life.  As people transition through 
increasing numbers of careers and locations in the face of today‘s lengthening life-spans, the 
potential to sustain cooperation despite breaks in accumulated reputation will be worthy of 
continuing attention by researchers.   
Department of Economics and Finance, Durham University  
Department of Economics, Brown University  
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Table 1.  Summary of Treatments, and Average Contributions 
 
Treatment mpcr 
The probability that 
contribution is 
recorded 
Total #  
of 
sessions 
Total 
number of 
sets 
Total #  
of subjects 
Average 
contributions 
       
(a) Treatments with Low Gains from Cooperation (F = 1.3)    
LI-LG .65 0% 2 4 40 1.66 
MI-LG .65 50% 2 4 40 3.57 
HI-LG .65 100% 2 4 40 3.85 
       
(b) Treatments with High Gains from Cooperation (F = 1.7)   
LI-HG .85 0% 2 4 40 4.59 
MI-HG .85 50% 3 5 50 6.62 
HI-HG .85 100% 2 4 40 7.38 
Experiment as a whole  13 21 210  
 
 
Notes:  Subject sets consist of ten randomly selected participants who remain together for all four phases, totaling forty 
periods.  Each session (with one exception) had two anonymously matched subject sets.  LI, MI and HI refer to low, 
medium, and high information conditions.  In all conditions, subjects know the ID of their counterpart and get 
feedback of the counterpart‘s action, with ID‘s fixed within each 10-period phase.  In MI and HI conditions, subjects 
have additional information about set members‘ past contributions in that the average contribution thus far in a 
randomly chosen 50% of past periods of the phase (MI) or in 100% of past periods of the phase (HI) are shown at the 
stage of partner selection and when deciding on contribution after pairing.  
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Figure 1. Average Contribution Period by Period 
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Table 2. Trends of Average Contributions by Treatment: Regression Analyses 
 
     Dependent variable: Set average contributions per period. 
 
       
 Treatment 
 Low Gains (F = 1.3) High Gains (F = 1.7) 
Independent Variable LI-LG  
(1) 
MI-LG 
(2) 
HI-LG 
(3)  
LI-HG 
(4) 
MI-HG 
(5) 
HI-HG  
(6) 
       
       
(a) Phase2 dummy 
{1 if Phase 2; 0 
otherwise} 
-1.09*** 
(0.17) 
-0.30 
(0.23) 
0.70*** 
(0.24) 
-.80*** 
(0.24) 
0.49* 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.33) 
       
(b) Phase3 dummy 
{1 if Phase 3; 0 
otherwise} 
-1.32*** 
(0.17) 
.14 
(0.23) 
1.27*** 
(0.24) 
-1.11*** 
(0.24) 
1.30*** 
(0.27) 
0.37 
(0.33) 
       
(c) Phase4 dummy 
{1 if Phase 3; 0 
otherwise} 
-1.28*** 
(0.17) 
.018 
(0.23) 
1.74*** 
(0.24) 
-1.15*** 
(0.24) 
1.26*** 
(0.27) 
0.39 
(0.33) 
       
(d) Period within 
phase1 {= 1, 2, …, 7}#1 
-0.13*** 
(0.036) 
-0.38*** 
(0.048) 
-0.57*** 
(0.050) 
-0.20*** 
(0.050) 
-0.26*** 
(0.057) 
-0.14** 
(0.069) 
       
(e) Period within phase2 
{= 8, 9, 10}
#2
 
-0.13*** 
(0.022) 
-0.45*** 
(0.029) 
-0.61*** 
(0.030) 
-0.26*** 
(0.030) 
-0.51*** 
(0.034) 
-0.41*** 
(0.041) 
       
Constant 3.29*** 5.86*** 6.16*** 6.60*** 7.94*** 8.67*** 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27) (0.30) (0.37) 
       
# of Observations 160 160 160 160 200 160 
F 23.45 53.57 102.14 22.81 69.34 32.67 
Prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
R-Squared .3695 .3339 .5430 .1580 .5445 .3583 
       
F test results       
       
(a) = (b)       
F 1.84 3.74 5.78** 1.62*** 9.03*** 0.31 
p-value (two-sided) .1774 .0549* .0174 .2057 .0030 .5794 
       
(a) = (c)       
F 1.16 1.92 19.14*** 2.10 8.21*** 0.35 
p-value (two-sided) .2826 .1681 .0000 .1497 .0046 .5537 
       
(b) = (c)       
F 0.08 0.30 3.88* .03 0.02 0.00 
p-value (two-sided) .7823 .5834 .0506 .8597 .8883 .9697 
       
(d) = (e)       
F 0.02 3.31* 1.27 2.88* 40.90*** 31.93*** 
p-value (two-sided) .8927 .0708 .2608 .0918 .0000 .0000 
       
 
Notes: Set fixed effects linear regressions. The dependent variables are per-period set average contribution.  
#1
 The Period within phase 1 variable equals 0 if it is in period 8, 9 or 10. 
#2
 The Period within phase 2 variable equals 
0 if it is in period 1, 2, ..., 6, or 7. Test results for the equality of the coefficient of each of variables (a) to variable (e) 
across treatments are found in Appendix Table B2. 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 3. End-effects Behaviour by Phase and Treatment: The Last Period in which a Subject 
Contributed a Positive Amount    
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Average Median 
 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
 
  
 
 
     
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Low Gains  
(F = 1.3) 
 
 
 
 
    
LI-LG 
7.05 
(3.46) 
5.55 
(4.37) 
4.50 
(4.36) 
4.15 
(4.21) 
8 8 4 4 
MI-LG 
7.75 
(3.12) 
7.33 
(2.81) 
6.18 
(3.47) 
5.88 
(3.15) 
9 8 7 7 
HI-LG 
7.63 
(3.12) 
7.53 
(1.91) 
6.83 
(2.77) 
6.60 
(2.55) 
9 8 8 7 
  
 
 
     
II. High Gains 
(F = 1.7)  
 
 
     
LI-HG 
7.38 
(3.61) 
6.83 
(4.04) 
6.63 
(4.00) 
5.88 
(3.96) 
9 9 9 7 
MI-HG 
8.82 
(1.77) 
8.14 
(2.46) 
8.52 
(1.36) 
8.00 
(1.67) 
9 9 9 8 
HI-HG 
9.35 
(1.10) 
8.85 
(1.78) 
8.83 
(1.11) 
8.48 
(1.15) 
10 9 9 9 
   
 
 
     
 
 
Notes. Numbers in parenthesis are standard deviations. We use 0 for a subject's last period if the subject contributed 
nothing during the entire phase. Test results in comparing the average last periods between treatments are found in 
Appendix Table B4. Parallel to this analysis, we also calculated the percentage of subjects that contributed nothing to 
their joint account by period and by treatment. The results are similar, and are omitted to conserve space.  
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Figure 2. The Percentage of Subjects that Contributed Positive Amounts in the Tenth Period of 
Each Phase, by Treatment 
(a) Low Gain Treatments (Factor = 1.3)  
 
 (a1) LI-LG  (a2) MI-LG (a3) HI-LG 
 
(b) High Gain Treatments (F = 1.7)  
 
 (b1) LI-HG  (b2) MI-HG (b3) HI-HG 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
44 
 
Table 4.  Period t Contribution versus Period t + 1 Partner’s Contribution 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Period t + 1 partner‘s contribution. 
 
         
Independent Variable 
MI-LG HI-LG MI-HG HI-HG 
t =1 
t > 1 
& t ≤ 7 
t =1 
t > 1 
& t ≤ 7 
t =1 
t > 1 
& t ≤ 7 
t =1 
t > 1 
& t ≤ 7 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
         
         
Own contribution in 
period t 
0.25** 
(0.066) 
0.15** 
(0.044) 
0.43 
(0.20) 
0.24*** 
(0.025) 
0.37*** 
(0.08) 
0.21** 
(0.060) 
0.61*** 
(0.071) 
0.24** 
(0.045) 
         
Own (recorded) past 
average contribution up 
to t − 1
1
 
---- 0.38** 
(0.10) 
---- 0.45*** 
(0.046) 
---- 0.29** 
(0.081) 
---- 0.54*** 
(0.047) 
         
Periods within phase 
({2, 3, …, 7}) 
---- -0.17** 
(0.040) 
---- -0.33*** 
(0.057) 
---- -0.28** 
(0.086) 
---- -0.17* 
(0.054) 
         
Phase 2 dummy -0.83* -0.29 0.49 -0.052 -0.17 -0.012 -0.11 -0.027 
{=1 if phase =2} (0.31) (0.14) (0.71) (0.14) (0.55) (0.30) (0.41) (0.27) 
         
Phase 3 dummy -0.12 -0.021 1.11 -0.26 0.93* 0.62 0.22 -0.038 
{=1 if phase =3} (0.45) (0.48) (0.93) (0.18) (0.42) (0.39) (0.76) (0.22) 
         
Phase 4 dummy -0.13 -0.29 2.05** -0.12 1.09** 0.74 0.64 -0.089 
{=1 if phase =4} (0.71) (0.28) (0.63) (0.30) (0.26) (0.53) (0.57) (0.25) 
         
Constant 3.79*** 2.02** 1.64 1.80*** 4.39*** 4.17** 2.98** 2.32** 
 (0.66) (0.47) (0.94) (0.20) (0.49) (0.92) (0.62) (0.42) 
         
# of Observations 160 955
2
 160 960 200 1200 160 960 
R-Squared .1320 .3806 .3093 .4952 .1459 .2420 .2320 .3696 
         
 
Notes: Individual fixed effects regression with robust standard errors clustered by set id. Only observations whose t is 
less than or equal to 7, and greater than 1 are used in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8).  
1
 If a subject's contribution decisions have not been recorded yet, then the median of other group members whose 
contribution decisions have been recorded at least once is used. 
2
 In one group, no contributions had yet been recorded as of period 22 in the MI-LG treatment; and thus the five 
observations of that group are excluded in this regression.  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the 0.05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Appendix A. Theoretical Predictions in the high information treatments. 
 In this appendix, we discuss some key theoretical predictions for our experimental design 
using a simple partial equilibrium model, in which all subjects are assumed to be either 
conditional cooperators or maximisers of own money payoff—hereafter, payoff-maximisers. 
Specifically, we examine how strong the reputation building motives are for payoff-maximisers 
in the HI treatments. Our prediction is that cooperation is more likely to be sustained in the HI-
HG treatment than in the HI-LG treatment, and the larger is the proportion of conditional 
cooperators, due to higher incentives to build a good reputation through which they can pair with 
subjects of that type. For simplicity, we suppose that there are only three types of subjects in the 
population: sophisticated selfish payoff maximisers, unsophisticated selfish agents who always 
contribute 0, and conditional cooperators. We focus on the behaviour of a sophisticated payoff 
maximiser who requires an expectation of material reward to motivate her cooperation, whereas 
conditional cooperators will contribute to their joint account whenever they expect the same 
from their counterpart, and unsophisticated selfish agents will always contribute 0. 
Suppose that each subject believes that the percentage of conditional cooperators is p, and 
that of payoff maximisers is 1 – p. Suppose also that these beliefs are correct: the percentage of 
conditional cooperators in the population is p in actuality. We now must make our assumptions 
about the choices conditional cooperators make more explicit.  In a flexible definition (see, for 
instance, Fischbacher and Gӓchter, 2010), a conditional cooperator is any individual whose 
preferred contribution rises as the expected contributions of others rise.  This leaves it possible 
that conditional cooperators are a class of agents, not a single homogeneous type.  For simplicity, 
we assume a uniform degree of reciprocity of our homogeneous conditional cooperator type.  We 
also need an assumption about conditional cooperators‘ expectations.  We assume that if a 
conditional cooperator meets with a subject having average past contribution, Ait, to the joint 
account, then, the conditional cooperator contributes x ∙ Ait, where x  (0, 1].  We focus on the 
HI treatments since subjects‘ previous average contributions are fully conveyed in them. For 
period 1, as there is no average past contribution available, we refer to the amounts that 
conditional cooperators contribute in period 1 as A0.
1
  
 
                                                          
1
 A0 can be exogenously set in a model, dependent on an assumption. One example is to set A0 equal to the expected 
proportion of conditional cooperators in the population.  
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ASSUMPTION 1. A conditional cooperator contributes x ∙ Ajt in periods 2 to 10, where Ajt is his 
or her counterpart’s average contribution to the joint account up to but not including period t.  
 
 In our analysis, we assume x = 1 for simplicity, although the implication that we obtain 
below would not change even if we assume x < 1, if x is not too small.  Also, Assumption 1 
implies very unsophisticated forecasting on the part of conditional cooperators, who expect each 
partner met to contribute her past average contribution even when there is evidence that 
contributions may be declining within the population.  Both the assumption that x = 1 and the 
naïve forecasting assumption may bias our model towards somewhat too optimistic predictions, 
but the flavor of its predictions should nonetheless stand. 
Our next assumption has an offsetting pessimistic bias: we assume that a selfish payoff 
maximiser i believes that all other selfish players contribute zero to the joint project, if they are 
matched as a pair. We assume, also, that this is indeed the case: all selfish players except i do 
contribute 0. Under these assumptions, we study how a strategically selfish payoff maximiser i 
has an incentive to build a good reputation as a mimicker of cooperation. The assumption on 
other selfish players‘ behaviour is extreme, but it is fine as a benchmark for a lower bound of the 
selfish player i‘s reputation building motive. 
 
ASSUMPTION 2. Selfish players other than i contribute zero in all periods. 
 
Furthermore, we restrict a selfish payoff maximiser i‘s possible domain of contributions 
from 0 to A0 (the contribution level of conditional cooperators in period 1); as it would be 
realistic to assume that if i is sufficiently sophisticated, he or she would want to avoid standing 
out from conditional cooperators.  In other words, under conditions that make contributing 
rational for the payoff-maximiser, contributing the entire endowment will generate the largest 
payoff, but we will assume that she foregoes the potential short-term gain since she is eliciting 
contributions by mimicking conditional cooperators, and it would be odd were our model to have 
mimickers contributing more than conditional cooperators yet assumed to be indistinguishable 
from them. 
Finally, we further simplify in a pessimistic direction by assuming that despite the mutual 
ranking mechanism, a selfish payoff maximiser i is randomly paired with a subject: that is, he or 
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she is paired with a conditional cooperator with probability p (1 − p for the case of being paired 
with a selfish payoff maximiser). We find that even in this circumstance, a payoff maximiser i 
has a substantial incentive to cooperate: a selfish player i contributes A0 to her joint account in all 
initial periods, but in a round k + 1 determined by p and mpcr, he or she changes to fully free-
riding, as in Proposition 1.  There is, then, even more incentive to cooperate when one adds to 
the account that this increases the likelihood of attracting a cooperating partner. 
 
Condition (A.1) in Proposition 1 summarises the duration of the cooperation by payoff 
maximiser i and it is very intuitive.        
 
 
(  ∑
 
   
    
   
   )        , which is 
included in Condition (A.1), indicates i‘s net gain from contributing one more unit to his joint 
account in period t.
 2
 For example, when t = 5, it is: 
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   )        . 
=         
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=         
 
 
        
 
 
        
 
 
        
 
 
        
 
 
          (A.0) 
 
 
When a selfish payoff maximiser i contributes one point to the joint account in period 5, i loses 
the opportunity to gain one point from his or her private account (this is ―−1‖ in expression 
(A.0)), but instead, i gets mpcr from the joint account in that period. In addition, i enjoys gains 
resulting from an increase in his or her average past contributions in the subsequent periods, 
periods 6 through 10. For instance, in period 8, his average past contribution rises by 
 
 
 when i 
contributes one point in period 5, as the average contribution in period 8 is calculated by the 
average of i‘s seven past contributions. Since the probability that i meets with a conditional 
cooperator in period 8 is p, and since we assume that the conditional cooperator matches i‘s 
average past contribution, i‘s marginal gain in period 8 is 
 
 
       .  
                                                          
2
 Note that t in this and the following expressions always refers to the period in which subject i is considering 
whether to contribute to the joint account, whereas s is a counter for remaining periods.  s takes maximum value 8 (= 
9 – t) because at most there can be 9 remaining periods of the 10 period phase, in period t = 1. Although future 
benefit may also be anticipated in period 9, the indicator 1t ≤ 8 takes value 1 up to decision-making period 8 only 
since the first 1 inside the parenthesis already captures the benefit in the immediately following period, in that case 
period 10.  
Period 5 earnings 
from joint account 
Total gains from the rises in his reputation in period 6 to 10 
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 If the net benefit, described in expression (A.0), is positive, i decides to contribute to his 
joint account in period 5. Notice that the earlier period it is (the smaller t is), the greater the value 
of expression (A.0) as there remain many future interactions. This means that for all periods t 
such that         
 
 
(  ∑
 
   
    
   
   )         > 0, a selfish player i invests in his or 
her joint account; beyond that period, however, i stops cooperating and changes to full free-
riding in all remaining periods of the finitely-repeated super-game, since the future gains from 
investing in the joint activity no longer compensates for its current cost (1 – mpcr). 
    
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that the series of assumptions above, including assumptions 1 and 2, 
hold. Then, in a given phase, a selfish payoff maximiser i continues to contribute A0 to her joint 
account until period k such that 
     ,  *          +         
 
 
(  ∑
 
   
    
   
   )          -   (A.1) 
where        if    ; = 0, otherwise. Then, he or she contributes 0 in period k + 1 and 
afterwards, and continues to free-ride until the end of a given phase. 
       
Proof:  
This optimization problem can be solved by using the standard optimal control theory (see Sethi 
and Thompson (2005)). 
 A selfish payoff maximiser i maximises his or her total expected earnings (material 
payoff) from his or her interactions with partners in the ten interactions of a given phase, with 
respect to his or her contribution decisions: 
       *       +*   ∑             (         )
  
   +, 
subject to:                 
   
 
 
   
 
,         . Here,     is player i‘s contribution in 
period t,        is subject i‘s earnings from the private account in period t, and           is 
the expected total contribution in his joint account in period t.       
   
   
 
   
   
 is obtained 
from the following relation: 
          (   )            (A.2)  
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This relation holds since     is subject i‘s average past contribution up to period t − 1.  Relation 
(A.2) reduces to: 
                      . 
In other words: 
         (     )   
   
 
 
   
 
. 
 The Hamiltonian   , in this problem, is defined as follows: 
               (         )   
   ( 
   
 
 
   
 
), 
where      is the shadow price of a unit of i‘s average past contribution in period t + 1; and thus, 
the fourth term,           
   ( 
   
 
 
   
 
) indicates the gain from periods t + 1 through 
period 10 when i contributes in period t. 
 Since    is linear in    , 
   
    
         
    
 
 does not depend on    . This means 
that        if 
   
    
  , whereas       if 
   
    
   (the selfish player‘s optimal solution is a 
―bang-bang solution‖ (Sethi and Thompson 2005)). The adjoint equation in our optimal control 
problem is: 
                
   
    
         
    
 
. (A.3) 
      . (A.4) 
Equations (A.3), by rearranging them, reduces to: 
    
   
 
            , for each t. (A.5) 
In other words, 
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where      is an indicator function; and        if    , and = 0 otherwise. In other words, 
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+
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Thus, we obtain the following: 
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   )         when t < 10. Here, 
 
 
        is a 
potential gain in period t + 1 from contributing marginal amounts in period t, and 
 
 
∑
 
   
    
   
           is the sum of the potential gains in periods t + 2 through 10 from the 
marginal contribution in period t. We also see that  
   
    
           when t = 10, as 
    
 
   (i.e. there is no gain by building a good reputation). From this, we find that a selfish 
payoff maximiser i contributes nothing in period 10 with certainty, but, in earlier period, t, the 
subject contributes    if 
   
    
  . The subject keeps contributing A0 until the period before the 
period such that         
 
 
(  ∑
 
   
    
   
   )         becomes negative for the first 
time.  In other words, the duration of cooperation, k, is such that 
k =   ,            
 
 
(  ∑
 
   
    
   
   )          -, 
where   is a set consisting of positive integers up to 9, and then, the subject contributes 0 in 
period k  + 1 and afterwards.  ■ 
      
Condition (A.1) in Proposition 1 gives us the threshold concerning the percentage of conditional 
cooperators (p) in the population so that a selfish payoff maximiser i chooses to cooperate in 
7 
 
each periods in the environment. The relationship between k and p is summarised as follows by 
mpcr: 
     
Table A1. k in the above prediction and the percentage of conditional cooperators, p. 
 
 
The duration of cooperation, by a selfish payoff maximiser i (k) 
mpcr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0.65 
19.0% 
≤ p < 
29.4% 
29.4% 
≤ p < 
40.5% 
40.5% 
≤ p < 
54.1% 
54.1% 
≤ p < 
72.2% 
72.2% 
≤ p < 
98.7% 
98.7% 
≤ p ≤ 
100% 
n.a. n.a n.a 
0.85 
6.2% 
≤ p < 
9.6% 
9.6% ≤ 
p < 
13.3% 
13.3% 
≤ p < 
17.7% 
17.7% 
≤ p < 
23.7% 
23.7% 
≤ p < 
32.3% 
32.3% 
≤ p < 
46.6% 
46.6% 
≤ p < 
74.7% 
74.7% 
≤ p ≤ 
100% 
n.a 
 
Notes: These solutions apply for play of a 10 period finitely-repeated game in which i is the only 
sophisticated selfish player, p is the proportion of conditionally cooperative players, and 
remaining players always contribute 0.  All numbers in the ranges of p are not exact numbers, 
but are rounded up to the first decimal points. 
 
For example, if mpcr is 0.65 (the efficiency factor is 1.3) and if p = 25%, then a selfish 
payoff maximiser i decides to cooperate only in period 1, after which she changes to full free-
riding. The calculations are for the purpose of providing benchmarks only, but they show that a 
selfish payoff maximiser i holds materially strong reputation building motives only in very early 
rounds in the LG treatment. The incentive to build a good reputation depends heavily on mpcr. 
We see that if mpcr is 0.85 (the efficiency factor is 1.7) and if p = 25%, a selfish payoff 
maximiser i cooperates in periods 1 through 5, which is a relatively longer duration; after which 
he or she changes to full free-riding.  
Also, Table A1 reveals that the incentive to build reputation is largely dependent on p. 
For example, a selfish payoff maximiser i, if p = 50%, instead of p = 25%, chooses to contribute 
until period 3 and to fully defect in period 4 and afterwards with mpcr of 0.65; but, chooses to 
cooperate until period 7 and to fully free ride in period 8 and afterwards with mpcr of 0.85. 
Kamei (2011) calculated the percentage of conditional cooperators at Brown University, Rhode 
Island, using the strategy method developed by Fischbacher et al. (2001), finding that it is around 
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50%.
3
 The numerical calculation above indicates that in our sample cooperation may sustain for 
a longer duration in the HG treatment, whereas it may be similarly high in very early periods but 
may quickly collapse in the LG treatment. 
Note that a selfish payoff maximiser i does not have an incentive to cooperate in period 9 
with mpcr of 0.65 or 0.85 according to Table A1; if mpcr were, however, extremely high, say, 
0.95, though not our experimental parameter, then, the cooperation sustains until period 9 for the 
community with p > 47.4%.  
     
These considerations using the numerical calculations give us the following additional 
predictions. 
        
COROLLARY 1. A selfish payoff maximiser i is more likely to cooperate for a longer duration 
with mpcr of 0.85 than with mpcr of 0.65. 
     
Thus far, we‘ve taken as a given that conditional cooperators are individuals who choose 
to match the expected contribution of their counterpart. One way to rationalise such behaviour is 
to assume that conditional cooperator j can be described by the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) utility 
function, with inequality averse preferences:   (     )           {       }     
   {       }, where        . The choice of the Fehr-Schmidt model is due to its 
tractability; conditional cooperation behaviour can also be explained by other types of social 
preference models such as reciprocity models. Then, a similar partial equilibrium analysis 
indicates that if p is high enough that   
 
     
{         }, j cooperates in the final round. 
       
PROPOSITION 2. Suppose that all conditional cooperators have the average past contribution 
of     in period 10. Also suppose that the percentage of conditional cooperators is large enough 
                                                          
3
 In the experiment of the present paper, the percentages of subjects that contributed positive amounts in period 10 
of phase 1 were 35.0% and 57.5% in the HI-LG and HI-HG treatments, respectively. As pointed out in our paper, 
contributing in the last period gives only a lower-bound indication of conditional cooperation, because a conditional 
cooperator who expects their counterpart to contribute 0 also contributes 0.  The smaller share of positive 
contributors in the HI-LG treatment may be largely due to diminished expectations that others will contribute in 
period 10, thanks to much lower contributions as that period approaches.  Placing slightly more weight on the 57.5% 
share for this reason, these numbers are broadly consistent with the estimate of Kamei (2011). 
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that      
 
     
{         } . Finally, suppose that each conditional cooperator treats 
the probability that her period 10 counterpart is a conditional cooperator as equal to p.
4
 Then, 
there exists an equilibrium in which all conditional cooperators choose to contribute      in the 
last round. 
 
Proof: In order to derive this prediction, all we have to do is to show that there is no incentive for 
a conditional cooperator to defect from the mutual cooperation equilibrium. 
 Assume that all conditional cooperators except j contributes the average past contribution 
amounts of their counterpart (i.e.,    ) in Period 10. Then, a conditional cooperator j‘s utility 
function is expressed as: 
  (    )               (          )       (        )          
      (        )          (   )         . 
Here, j meets with a selfish free-rider with a probability of    , and incurs a disutility         
due to a disadvantageous disutility, which is the last term in the above utility function,   (  
 )         . 
 The first-order condition reduces to: 
   
     
 {
             (   )                
             (   )                
. 
From this, we know that 
   
     
   if        , as mpcr < 1 always. Also, since we assume that 
      
 
     
{         }, 
   
     
   when         . This means that          is j‘s 
optimal contribution.  ■ 
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Appendix B. Additional Analysis, Tables and Figures. 
Table B1. Average Contribution by Treatment, and Related Non-Parametric Test Results 
    
(1) Average contribution by phase 
 
    Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
 
 
1
st
 period Average 1
st
 period Average 1
st
 period Average 1
st
 period Average 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info 3.73 2.58 2.08 1.50 1.68 1.27 1.10 1.31 
Medium info 4.85 3.60 5.38 3.31 5.90 3.75 6.13 3.62 
High info 4.88 2.92 6.45 3.63 7.90 4.19 8.28 4.68 
  
 
 
  
 
  
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info 6.28 5.35 4.88 4.55 5.60 4.25 5.05 4.21 
Medium info 7.02 5.86 8.22 6.34 8.76 7.15 9.02 7.12 
High info 7.70 7.14 8.50 7.33 9.03 7.52 9.08 7.53 
 
(2) Did contributions rise over the phases? 
 
(2-1) Set-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests 
 
    Comparison of the average contribution by phase Comparison of the first periods within phase 
 
 
Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .0679* .1441 .7150 .0679* .0679* .1441 .0947* .0679* 
Medium info .1441 .4652 .4652 1.000 .4615 .7150 .3573 .0679* 
High info .1441 .2733 .4652 .0679* .0679* .0679* .2733 .0679* 
  
 
 
  
 
  
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .1441 .4652 .7150 .2733 .4652 .4652 .0947* .2733 
Medium info .1380 .0782* .6858 .2249 .1380 .0782* .6858 .0431** 
High info .5775 .7150 1.0000 .7150 .1441 .1615 .8415 .1441 
 Notes: Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Comparison of the average contribution during periods 1 – 5  
by phase 
Comparison of the average contribution during periods 1 – 7  
by phase 
  
Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .7150 .7150 .0679* .1441 .7150 1.0000 .1441 .1441 
Medium info .0679* .4652 .7127 .4652 .4652 .2733 1.0000 .7150 
High info .0679* .2733 .2733 .0679* .0679* .2733 .4652 .0679* 
  
 
 
  
 
  
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .2733 .4652 .0679* .4652 .1441 .4652 .4652 .2733 
Medium info .1380 .1380 .0796* .0431** .0431** .0431** .5002 .0431** 
High info .0679* .5775 .5775 .0679* .1441 .5775 .0947* .0679* 
 
 Notes: Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
  
 
(2-2) Individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests 
 
 
    Comparison of the average contribution by phase Comparison of the first periods within phase  
 
 
Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .0001*** .0739** .7044 .0005*** .0007*** .0056*** .0028*** .0000*** 
Medium info .3054 .1120 .4319 .7983 .1212 .0852* .3721 .0660* 
High info .0813* .0222** .2484 .0000*** .0094*** .0003*** .0041*** .0000*** 
  
 
 
  
 
  
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .0974* .1635 .5869 .0016*** .1072 .6050 .2950 .0274** 
Medium info .1269 .0218** .5172 .0029*** .0147** .0165** .0167** .0002*** 
High info .8983 .7707 .3169 .5674 .0741* .0155** .2247 .0023*** 
 Notes: Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Comparison of the average contribution during periods 1 – 5  
by phase 
Comparison of the average contribution during periods 1 – 7  
by phase 
  
Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 2 Phase 2 vs. 3 Phase 3 vs. 4 Phase 1 vs. 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .0001*** .0435** .3095 .0001*** .0000*** .0380** .4026 .0001*** 
Medium info .6518 .0672* .5725 .2462 .5496 .0612* .8219 .2447 
High info .0094*** .0141** .0268** .0000*** .0274** .0180** .0406** .0000*** 
  
 
 
  
 
  
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
  
 
  
Low info .3318 .1554 .6871 .1073 .1027 .0703* .5167 .0242** 
Medium info .0081*** .0056*** .0939* .0000*** .0147** .0034*** .5432 .0000*** 
High info .0062*** .0862* .0546* .0001*** .0359** .2227 .0380** .0001*** 
 
 Notes: Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
Results:  
 
In the LI-LG treatment, the per-phase average contribution decreased over the phases. Also, the first contributions decreased over the 
phases (periods 1, 11, 21) in this treatment. The decreasing trends are sometimes significant at the 10% level according to set-level 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, but are significant at the 5% or 1% level according to individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. 
 
In the HI-LG treatment, by contrast, the first contributions increased over the phases. The increase in the first contribution, based on 
a comparison between those in phase 1 and phase 4, is significant at the 10% level according to a set-level Wilcoxon signed ranks test, 
and at the 1% level according to an individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks test. 
 
In the HG treatments, with the MI or HI condition, the first contributions rose over the phases. The increase in the contribution, based 
on a comparison between phase 1 and phase4, is significant at the 5% level under the MI condition according to set-level Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test, and at the 1% level under each condition according to individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks test.  
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(3) Did contributions rise or decline within phases? 
 
(3-1) Average Contributions in Periods 1 to 4 and in Periods 5 to 8 
 
 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
 
 
Pds 1−4 Pds 5−8 Pds 1−4 Pds 5−8 Pds 1−4 Pds 5−8 Pds 1−4 Pds 5−8 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
     
Low info 3.457 2.250 1.975 1.413 1.594 1.213 1.263 1.413 
Medium info 4.656 3.313 4.506 3.303 5.050 3.644 5.169 3.413 
High info 3.963 2.600 5.306 3.075 6.388 3.431 7.081 4.075 
  
 
 
     
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
     
Low info 6.119 5.25 5.15 4.525 4.913 4.131 5.088 4.169 
Medium info 6.615 5.995 7.62 6.365 8.68 7.54 8.945 7.61 
High info 7.444 7.481 8.244 7.763 8.781 8.006 9.156 8.125 
 
 
(3-2) Wilcoxon signed ranks tests: Average contributions in Periods 1−4 versus Period 5−8 
 
    Set-level test Individual-level test 
 
 
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Low info .0679* .1441 .2733 .4652 .0011*** .0331** .1731 .4795 
Medium info .0679* .0679* .0679* .0679* .0132** .0007*** .0011*** .0001*** 
High info .0679* .0679* .0679* .0679* .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
  
  
 
  
 
 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
  
 
  
 
 
Low info .0679* .1441 .1441 .0679* .0497** .3619 .0347** .0872* 
Medium info .2249 .0431** .0431** .0431** .2333 .0001*** .0098*** .0001*** 
High info .7150 .0947* .0679* .0679* .4462 .1060 .0142** .0032*** 
 
 Notes: Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Results:  
 
In both LG and HG treatments, regardless of the difference in the information conditions, in most comparisons, the average 
contributions in periods 5−8 are significantly lower than those in periods 1−4 at the 10% or sometimes at the 5% level, according to 
set-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, and often at the 1% level according to individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. 
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(4) The difference in average contribution between the treatments: ―Set-level‖ Mann Whitney test results 
 
(4a) Phase 1                                                                                 (4b) Phase 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .3865 .8845 .0209** .0143** .0209**  ---- .1489 .0433** .0209** .0143** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ---- .5637 .03865** .05** .0833*  ---- ---- 1.000 .3865 .0275** .0833* 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0833* .0275** .0433**  ---- ---- ---- .3865 .0275** .0433** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .4624 .1489  ---- ---- ---- ---- .1416 .0833* 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1416  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .4624 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
(4c) Phase 3                                                                                  (4d) Phase 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0833* .0833* .0833* .0143** .0209**  ---- .1489 .0209** .1489 .0143** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ----  1.000 .5637 .0275** .0433**  ---- ---- .5637 .5637 .0275** .0209** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .7728 .0275** .0433*  ---- ---- ---- .7728 .0864* .0833* 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .500 .0833*  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0864* .0833* 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .8065  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .6242 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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      (4e) Period 1 (First period in Phase 1)                                                 (4f) Period 11 (First period in Phase 2) 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .3065 .0421** .0204** .0139** .0202**  ---- .0209** .0202** .0294** .0143** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ---- 1.000 .1102 .0143** .0591*  ---- ---- .3836 .7728 .5000 .0833* 
High info ---- ---- ---- .1489 .1430 .1489  ---- ---- ---- .3065 .2129 .1465 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .6242 .1489  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0500** .0433** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2207  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .6242 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
      (4g) Period 21 (First period in Phase 3)                                                 (4h) Period 31 (First period in Phase 4) 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0194** .0202** .0202** .0135* .0202**  ---- .0209** .0209** .0209** .0143** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ---- .0814* .8839 .0194** .0202**  ---- ---- .0433** .6631 .0143** .0209** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .3865 .0639* .0833*  ---- ---- ---- .1489 .1761 .1913 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0491** .0433**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0500** .0433** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .5316  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .8065 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Set-level Mann-Whitney test. Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. 
18 
 
 
Results:  
 
The average contribution in the LI-HG treatment is significantly higher than that in the LI-LG treatment in Phases 1 to Phase 3 at the 
5% or at the 10% level, but the difference is not significant in Phase 4. The average contributions in the MI-HG treatment and in the 
HI-HG treatment are significantly higher than those in the MI-LG and HI-LG treatment in each phase, often at the 5% level and 
sometimes as the 10% level. 
 
In the LG treatments, the average contribution is significantly higher with the HI condition than that with the LI condition at the 5% 
level in Phases 2 and 4, and at the 10% level in Phase 3. 
 
In the HG treatments, the average contribution is significantly higher with the HI condition than that with the LI condition in Phases 2, 
3, and 4 at the 10% level. In Phase 4, the average contribution is also significantly higher with the MI condition than that with the LI 
condition at the 10% level.  
   
The first contribution is significantly higher in the HI-LG treatment and in the MI-LG treatment than in the LI-LG treatment, at the 
5% level in Phases 2, 3 and 4.     
    
The first contribution is significantly higher in the HI-HG treatment and in the MI-HG treatment than in the LI-HG treatment, at the 
5% level in Phases 2, 3 and 4.  
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(5) The difference in average contribution between the treatments: ―Individual-level‖ Mann Whitney test results 
 
(5a) Phase 1                                                                                (5b) Phase 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0787* .4640 .0007*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .0127** .0004*** .0003*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .1269 .0298** .0007*** .0000***  ---- ---- .3861 .2031 .0000*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0023*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .3755 .0000*** .0000*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .6315 .0336**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0001*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0271**  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0898* 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
(5c) Phase 3                                                                               (5d) Phase 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0000*** .0000*** .0002*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- 
.0001**
* 
.0000*** .0004*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .2831 .6157 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .0748* .6292 .0000*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .9118 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .4464 .0000*** .0000*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0001*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0002*** .0001*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2311  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3341 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Notes: Individual-level Mann-Whitney test. Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 
level, respectively. 
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      (5e) Period 1 (First period in Phase 1)                                                 (5f) Period 11 (First period in Phase 2) 
 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .2188 .1356 .0074*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .0004*** .0000*** .0152** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .9532 .1229 .0123** .0018***  ---- ---- .2831 .6731 .0004*** .0001*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .1356 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .1367 .0016*** .0004*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .6135 .2612  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0004*** .0002*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3468  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3848 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
      (5g) Period 21 (First period in Phase 3)                                                 (5h) Period 31 (First period in Phase 4) 
 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
Info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0000*** .0000*** .0001*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .0437** .8544 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .0398** .2498 .0001*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0490** .0019*** .0002***  ---- ---- ---- .0008*** .0138** .0016*** 
II. Factor of 
1.7  
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0001*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3626  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3176 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Individual-level Mann-Whitney test. Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 
level, respectively. 
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Table B2. Test Results for the Equality of the Coefficients of Variables (a) through (e) across the 
treatments in Table 2 (supplementing the regression analysis in Table 2 of “Play it Again”) 
 
 
(I) For equality of the coefficients of variable (a): 
 
 
 
  Treatment  
  
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
LI-LG ---- .0313*** .0000*** .4353 .0000*** .0005*** 
MI-LG ---- ---- .0063*** .1691 .0239** .1822 
HI-LG ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .5321 .1608 
LI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- .0002*** .0068*** 
MI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3931 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided F test. Numbers in the panel are p-values (two-sided).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients 
of all variables using a pooled regression, and then performed F tests. 
 
 
(II) For equality of the coefficients of variable (b): 
 
 
 
  Treatment  
  
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
LI-LG ---- .0001*** .0000*** .5607 .0000*** .0000*** 
MI-LG ---- ---- .0021*** .0007** .0009*** .5289 
HI-LG ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .9356 .0142** 
LI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0001*** 
MI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0077*** 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided F test. Numbers in the panel are p-values (two-sided).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients 
of all variables using a pooled regression, and then performed F tests. 
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(III) For equality of the coefficients of variable (c): 
 
 
 
  Treatment  
  
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
LI-LG ---- .0004*** .0000*** .7373 .0000*** .0000*** 
MI-LG ---- ---- .0000*** .0015** .0004*** .3145 
HI-LG ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .1706 .0002*** 
LI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
MI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0117** 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided F test. Numbers in the panel are p-values (two-sided).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients 
of all variables using a pooled regression, and then performed F tests. 
 
 
 
(IV) For equality of the coefficients of variable (d): 
 
 
 
  Treatment  
  
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
LI-LG ---- .0010*** .0000*** .3597 .0777* .8216 
MI-LG ---- ---- .0139** .0167** .0844* .0021*** 
HI-LG ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
LI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- .4238 .4899 
MI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1268 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided F test. Numbers in the panel are p-values (two-sided).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients 
of all variables using a pooled regression, and then performed F tests. 
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(V) For equality of the coefficients of variable (e): 
 
 
 
  Treatment  
  
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
LI-LG ---- .0000*** .0000*** .0061*** .0000*** .0000*** 
MI-LG ---- ---- .0003*** .0001*** .1334 .5558 
HI-LG ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0191** .0000*** 
LI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0006*** 
MI-HG ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0340** 
 
 
Notes: Two-sided F test. Numbers in the panel are p-values (two-sided).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients 
of all variables using a pooled regression, and then performed F tests.
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Table B3. Trends of Average Contributions by Treatment: Regression Analyses (supplementing 
the regression analysis in Table 2 of “Play it Again”) 
 
 
Case 1: Dependent variable: Set average contributions during periods 1 to 10 of each phase. 
 
       
 Group account efficiency 
 Factor of 1.3 (LG) Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
Independent Variable Low info 
(1) 
Medium info 
(2) 
High info 
(3)  
Low info 
(4) 
Medium info 
(5) 
High info 
(6) 
       
       
Phase variable 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4} 
-0.40*** 
(0.10) 
.049  
(0.16) 
0.58*** 
(0.13) 
-0.37** 
(0.15) 
0.46*** 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
       
Constant 2.68*** 3.45*** 2.41*** 5.53*** 5.47*** 7.05*** 
 (0.27) (0.43) (0.36) (0.42) (0.37) (0.40) 
       
# of Observations 16 16 16 16 20 16 
F 16.44 0.10 19.58 5.97 11.86 0.84 
Prob > F .0019 .7577 .0010 .0327 .0040 .3790 
R-Squared .3917 .0011 .1607 .0464 .1773 .0100 
       
 
Notes: Set fixed effects linear regressions. The dependent variables are set-level average contribution during periods 
1 to 7. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
 
Case 2: Dependent variable: Set average contributions during periods 1 to 7 of each phase. 
 
       
 Group account efficiency 
 Factor of 1.3 (LG) Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
Independent Variable Low info 
(1) 
Medium info 
(2) 
High info 
(3)  
Low info 
(4) 
Medium info 
(5) 
High info 
(6) 
       
       
Phase variable 
{= 1, 2, 3, 4} 
-0.54*** 
(0.11) 
0.21  
(0.17) 
0.86*** 
(0.16) 
-0.33* 
(0.18) 
0.75*** 
(0.13) 
0.46** 
(0.15) 
       
Constant 3.20 3.78*** 2.65*** 5.86*** 5.76*** 7.11*** 
 (0.30) (0.47) (0.43) (0.49) (0.35) (0.41) 
       
# of Observations 16 16 16 16 20 16 
F 24.03 1.47 29.57 3.45 34.02 9.31 
Prob > F .0005 .2507 .0002 .0902 .0000 .0110 
R-Squared .5223 .0152 .2698 .0315 .3611 .1078 
       
 
Notes: Set fixed effects linear regressions. The dependent variables are set-level average contribution during periods 
1 to 7 of each phase. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. 
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Table B4. Non-parametric Test Results for the difference of average last period that subjects 
contribute  a positive amount, across phases or across treatments (supplementing the analysis in 
Table 3 of “Play it Again”) 
 
(1) Did the last period that subjects contribute a positive amount become earlier and earlier over 
the phases? (Test of earlier decay feature) 
 
(1-1) Set-level Wilcoxon-signed ranks tests 
 
  
  
Comparison of the average last period in which a subject contributed a 
positive amount, by treatment 
 
 
Phase 1 
vs. 2 
Phase 1 
vs. 3 
Phase 1 
vs. 4 
Phase 2 
vs. 3 
Phase 2 
vs. 4 
Phase 3  
vs. 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
    
 
Low info .1441 .0679* .0656* .1441 .1441 .2733 
Medium info .2733 .0947* .0679* .2733 .0656* .4652 
High info 1.000 .1441 .4652 .7150 .0679* .7150 
  
    
 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
    
 
Low info .0947* .0679* .0679* .1975 .0679* .0679* 
Medium info .0422** .2249 .0796* .2249 .5002 .0568* 
High info .0679* .0656* .0588* 1.000 .0947* .0656* 
 
 
Notes: Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at 
the .01 level, respectively. 
 
 
(1-2) Individual-level Wilcoxon-signed ranks tests 
 
  
  
Comparison of the last periods in which a subject selected a positive 
amount by treatment 
 
 
Phase 1  
vs. 2 
Phase 1  
vs. 3 
Phase 1 
vs. 4 
Phase 2  
vs. 3 
Phase 2 
vs. 4 
Phase 3  
vs. 4 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
    
 
Low info .0013*** .0001*** .0004*** .0442** .0172** .5937 
Medium info .0932* .0015*** .0002*** .0292** .0112** .1947 
High info .3500 .1023 .0206** .1296 .0205** .2851 
  
    
 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
    
 
Low info .1951 .0374** .0001*** .3654 .0016*** .0048*** 
Medium info .0291** .0314** .0005*** .3275 .1708 .0085*** 
High info .0509* .0005*** .0000*** .0726* .0219** .0057*** 
 
 
Notes: Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at 
the .01 level, respectively. 
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Results: In the HG treatments, the average last period in which subjects contributed a positive 
amount became earlier in Phase 2 compared with Phase 1, and also in Phase 4 compared with 
Phase 3; the differences are significant at the 10% level (in Phase 2 at the 5% level for the MI-
HG treatment) according to set-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. Results are similar in Phase 2 
but are stronger in Phase 4 when individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests are used. 
 
In the LI-LG treatment and the MI-LG treatment, the average last periods in which subjects 
contributed a positive amount became earlier in Phase 2 compared with Phase 1, and also in 
Phase 3 compared with Phase 2; the differences are significant according to individual-level 
Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. The average last period in which subjects contributed positive 
amounts  in the LI-LG treatment and MI-LG treatment are significantly earlier in Phase 4 
compared with Phase 1 at the 10% level according to a set-level Wilcoxon signed ranks test.  
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(2) Between-treatment difference in the last period in which a subject contributed a positive amount: Set-level Mann Whitney test 
results 
(2a) Phase 1                                                                                 (2b) Phase 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .2482 .2482 .4678 .0143** .0202**  ---- .1102 .0833* .3094 .0275** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ---- 1.000 .4678 .3893 .0421*  ---- ---- .7728 .8845 .1416 .0433** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .4678 .3893 .0759*  ---- ---- ---- .5637 .3231 .0591* 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0143** .0202**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .1099 .0433** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0639*  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1761 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
(2c) Phase 3                                                                                  (2d) Phase 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .2454 .1489 .0833* .0139** .0209**  ---- .1102 .0433** .2482 .0143** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ---- .7715 .7715 .1383 .1465  ---- ---- .7728 .7728 .0500** .0209** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .7728 .0851* .0294**  ---- ---- ---- .7728 .2683 .1102 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0139** .0209**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0500** .0209** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1743  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2683 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(3) Between-treatment difference in the last period in which a subject contributed a positive amount: Individual-level Mann Whitney 
test results 
 (3a) Phase 1                                                                                (3b) Phase 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .3867 .5110 .4712 .0192** .0010***  ---- .2620 .3177 .2385 .0186** .0012** 
Medium info ---- ---- .8003 .9602 .1469** .0059***  ---- ---- .7474 .5690 .1084 .0027*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .8383 .0871* .0031***  ---- ---- ---- .6155 .0248** .0002*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .1881 .0157**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .1858 .0371** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1187  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1595 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
(3c) Phase 3                                                                               (3d) Phase 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
Info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0152** .0338** .0371** .0002*** .0001***  ---- .0749* .0165** .0871* .0002*** .0001*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .5145 .3145 .0016*** .0003***  ---- ---- .3745 .5732 .0005*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .4102 .0018*** .0001***  ---- ---- ---- .9806 .0037*** .0001*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .2367 .1168  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0647* .0142** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3459  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2396 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Numbers are p-values (2-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Results:  
 
[Comparison across the different information conditions:] 
 
In the LG treatments, the average last period in which subjects contributed a positive amount is significantly earlier in the LI 
condition than in the HI condition at the 10% level in Phase 2, and at the 5% level in Phase 4, according to set-level Mann-Whitney 
tests. 
     
In the HG treatments, the average last period in which subjects contributed a positive amount is significantly earlier in the LI 
condition than in the MI or in the HI condition in each phase (except the comparison between the LI and MI conditions in Phase 2) 
according to set-level Mann-Whitney tests. 
 
[Comparison between the different factors, 1.3 (LG) versus 1.7 (HG):] 
 
In the LI condition, the average last period is significantly later with Factor 1.7 than with Factor 1.3 at the 10% level in Phase 3 
according to a set-level Mann-Whitney test. In the MI condition, the average last period is significantly later with Factor 1.7 than with 
Factor 1.3 at the 5% level in Phase 4 according to a set-level Mann-Whitney test. In the HI info condition, the average last period is 
significantly later with Factor 1.7 than with Factor 1.3, at the 10% level in Phases 1 and 2, and at the 5% level in Phase 3, according 
to set-level Mann-Whitney tests. Results are more strongly significant if we use individual-level Mann-Whitney tests. 
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Table B5.  End-effects Behaviour by Phase and Treatment. In this table, we examine how 
subject i made his or her contribution decision in the tenth period of a given phase if subject i has 
always contributed 10 so far in the phase and subject j (i‘s partner in that period) has also only 
contributed 10 so far in that phase, inasmuch as subject i can know. 
   
This analysis is a supplementary analysis for Tables 3 of ―Play it Again‖ and Table B4 of this 
Appendix. 
      
Although we found, as indicated by Figure 2 of ―Play it Again,‖ that the majority of subjects 
chose 0 in the tenth period of each phase other than Phase 1 of the HI-HG treatment, and that the 
last periods in which subjects contributed positive amounts to their joint account became earlier 
over the phases, it is still interesting to see how subject i was playing in the last period of a phase 
under the following circumstance: subject i has always contributed 10 so far and j (i‘s partner in 
the tenth period) has also only contributed 10 so far, at least inasmuch as subject i can know.
5
   
    
By studying these cases, we can examine: (a) whether anyone has enough faith in their 
counterparts to be conditionally cooperative, and is himself conditionally cooperative, in that he 
contributes even in the last period, and (b) whether or not a ―personal‖ connection between 
subject i and subject j (that is, having interacted together for some number of periods during the 
current phase) influences that faith (or alternatively, simply the desire to avoid being the only 
one who defects). 
     
We counted eligible cases only in the MI and the HI treatments, since cooperation collapsed 
quickly in the LI treatments.  
     
It turned out that the eligible cases are relatively few in our sample. We found 36 cases in the MI 
treatments and 3 cases in the HI treatments. We see that out of the 36 and the 3 cases, a 
substantial number of cases (17 cases out of the 39 cases), or subjects (13 out of 23 subjects) also 
contributed 10 in one of the tenth periods. This suggests that nearly half of high contributors 
were genuine conditional cooperators in the sense that they did not wish to contribute zero when 
there seemed to them to be a real chance that their counterpart would contribute a positive 
amount (in our terms, that their counterpart was a genuine conditional cooperator who would not 
automatically defect because the last period of the phase had arrived).  As argued in the paper, 
this kind of estimate should be viewed as ―lower bound‖ in nature since some of the remaining 
10 subjects may also have been conditional cooperators but had less optimistic beliefs about their 
counterparts.   Detailed results are summarised on the next pages. 
  
                                                          
5
 In the MI treatments, this condition reduces to the conditions that (1) Subject j has always contributed 10 when he 
or she was matched with subject i so far; (2) Subject j‘s recorded average past contribution as of the tenth period of 
the phase is 10. 
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(1) LG treatments 
 
   
 Information Condition 
    
 Medium info High info 
      
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
         
         
# of all 
eligible cases 
0 0 2 1 0 0 0 1 
         
Contribution decision in Period 10       
(a) 10 N/A N/A 2 (100%) 1 (100%) N/A N/A N/A 1 (100%) 
(b) Between 
5 and 9 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(c) Between 
1 and 4 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(d) 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
   
Notes: Numbers in the table are the numbers of the eligible cases, and numbers in parenthesis are the percentages of 
those who contributed either 10 (in row (a)), between 5 and 9 (in row (b)), between 1 and 4 (in row (c)) and 0 (in 
row (d)), out of all of the eligible cases. 
 
 
(2) HG treatments 
 
   
 Information Condition 
    
 Medium info High info 
      
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 
         
         
# of all 
eligible cases 
0 8 13 12 0 1 0 1 
         
Contribution decision in Period 10       
(a) 10 N/A 
5 
(62.5%) 
4 
(30.8%) 
3  
(25%) 
N/A 
1 
(100%) 
N/A N/A 
(b) Between 5 
and 9 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(c) Between 1 
and 4 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
(d) 0 N/A 
3 
(37.5%) 
9 
(69.2%) 
9  
(75%) 
N/A N/A N/A 
1 
(100%) 
         
 
Notes: Numbers in the table are the numbers of the eligible cases, and numbers in parenthesis are the percentages of 
those who contributed either 10 (in row (a)), between 5 and 9 (in row (b)), between 1 and 4 (in row (c)) and 0 (in 
row (d)), out of all of the eligible cases. 
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Table B6.  Explaining end-of –phase (period 10, 20, etc.) contribution decisions by negative 
experience with past end-of-phase partners’ contribution decisions 
(supplementing the analysis in Table 3 of “Play it Again,” and Tables B4 and B5 in the 
Appendix)     
    
 
      Dependent Variable: Subject i‘s contribution decision in period t  {10, 20, 30, 40} 
 
 
   
Independent Variable MI-HG HI-HG 
   
   
Phase 2 dummy {= 1 if Phase =2; 0 otherwise} -3.41 
(4.06) 
-4.19 
(3.99) 
   
Phase 3 dummy {= 1 if Phase =3; 0 otherwise } -9.86* 
(5.32) 
-10.4** 
(4.98) 
   
Phase 4 dummy {= 1 if Phase =4; 0 otherwise } -15.2** 
(5.98) 
-15.5*** 
(5.83) 
   
Average recorded past contribution of the 
counterpart
1 
2.03*** 
(0.64) 
1.35 
(0.84) 
   
Maximum deviation of a past counterpart‘s 
contribution in period t {8, 9, 10} from that past 
counterpart‘s (recorded) past average contribution2 
-0.88* 
(0.53) 
-1.86*** 
(0.69) 
   
Maximum deviation of a past counterpart‘s 
contribution in period t {5, 6, 7} from that past 
counterpart‘s (recorded) past average contribution3 
0.53 
(0.55) 
1.10 
(0.88) 
   
Constant -14.7*** -5.96 
 (5.66) (7.82) 
   
# of Observations 200 160 
Log likelihood -213.7 -170.4 
Wald Chi-squared 18.68 19.21 
Prob > Wald Chi-squared .0047 .0038 
   
 
 
Notes: Random Effects Tobit regressions. The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 139(30) in column 
(1) and 103(33) in column (2).  
  
1
 See Table B11 as for the method of calculating this variable in the MI-HG treatment.  
  
2
 By deviation, we refer to the drop in a counterpart j‘s contribution in a late period (8, 9 or 10) relative to what a 
naïve subject i would have expected j to contribute using j‘s past average contribution (in MI treatments, recorded 
past average contribution) as the estimate. 
 
3
 Same as previous variable except refers to earlier periods (5, 6 or 7) of a phase. 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table B7. Determinants of Ranking Decisions in the MI and HI treatments  
 
(A) Regression results 
 
      Dependent variable: Rank given to subject j in Period t. 
 
     
 Group account efficiency 
 Factor of 1.3 (LG) Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
Independent Variable Medium info 
(1) 
High info 
(2)  
Medium info 
(3) 
High info 
(4) 
     
     
(a) subject j‘s Average 
Previous Contribution 
-0.42*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.43*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.44*** 
(0.0084) 
-0.53*** 
(0.012) 
     
(b) share of past periods for 
which information is included 
-0.93*** 
(0.10) 
---- 
-0.82*** 
(0.093) 
---- 
     
Constant 5.45*** 5.32*** 6.82*** 7.42*** 
 (0.14) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
     
# of Observations 6345 7200 8210 7200 
Log Likelihood -9508.9 -11452.1 -12886.4 -11587.3 
Chi-squared 3235.5 2314.8 2869.4 1896.3 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     
 
 
Notes: Individual random effect Tobit regressions.  Only observations whose variable (b) is greater than 0 are used. 
The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 1379(1236) in column (1), 1440(1440) in column (2), 
1729(1540) in column (3) and 1440(1440) in column (4). Ex-post efficiency of the ranking procedure is measured 
by calculating the bivariate correlations between matched pairs‘ their past contribution decisions, whose results are 
found in Appendix Tables B10 and B11. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at 
the .01 level, respectively. 
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(B) Test Results for the Equality of the Coefficients of Variables (a) and (b) across treatments in 
Panel (A) 
 
 
(I) For the equality of coefficients on Variable (a) (j‘s average past contribution) 
 
 
 
  Treatment 
    MI-LG HI-LG MI-HG HI-HG 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
MI-LG ---- .7132 .2445 .0075*** 
HI-LG ---- ---- .4448 .0039*** 
MI-HG ---- ---- ---- .0001*** 
 
Notes: Two-sided Chi-squared test results. Numbers in the table are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. For this test, we first jointly estimated 
the coefficients of all variables using a pooled regression, and then performed Chi-squared tests. 
 
 
 
(II) For the equality of coefficients on Variable (b) (share of past periods for which information is 
included) 
 
 
       Two-sided Chi-squared test results:  p-value = .0017*** 
 
 
 Notes: *** indicate significance at the .01 level. For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients of all 
variables using a pooled regression, and then performed Chi-squared tests. 
  
35 
 
Table B8. A Regression Analysis for Strategic Ranking Behaviour of Those Whose Average Past 
Contributions are Lower 
 
(I) Regression Result 
 
Dependent variable: A binary variable which equals 1 if a subject did not give his or her 
highest rank to the highest contributor in the other subgroup of five; 0 otherwise. 
 
   
 HI treatment 
Independent Variable Factor of 1.3 (LG) 
(1) 
Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
(2)  
   
   
                                 
                              
                                     
                                            
. 
 
{This variable is a proxy of the relative contribution 
standing of the person who is going to rank} 
-1.02*** 
(0.16) 
-1.43*** 
(0.28) 
   
(a) Phase 2 dummy 
{=1 if Phase 2; 0 otherwise} 
0.11 
(0.12) 
-0.38*** 
(0.14) 
   
(b) Phase 3 dummy 
{=1 if Phase 3; 0 otherwise} 
0.54*** 
(0.12) 
-0.40*** 
(0.15) 
   
(c) Phase 4 dummy 
{=1 if Phase 3; 0 otherwise} 
0.43*** 
(0.13) 
-0.80*** 
(0.17) 
   
Periods within phase 
{= 1, 2, …, 9, 10} 
0.089*** 
(0.017) 
0.10*** 
(0.022) 
   
Constant -1.11*** -0.77*** 
 (0.22) (0.30) 
   
# of Observations 1440 1440 
Log likelihood -629.88 -370.66 
Wald Chi-squared 86.24 70.56 
Prob > Wald Chi-squared .0000 .0000 
   
 
Notes: Individual random effect probit regressions.  ―Highest rank‖ refers to best rank, namely a rank of 1.  All 
observations but period 1 are used.*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 
level, respectively. 
 
(II) A Test for the equality of the coefficients of the ―The ratio of the average past contribution of the 
person who is going to rank, to the maximum average past contribution among the five in the other 
subgroup‖ variable between column (1) and column (2) 
 
       Two-sided Chi-squared test results:  p-value = .3174 
 
 Note: For this test, we first jointly estimated the coefficients of all variables using a pooled regression, then 
performed Chi-squared tests. 
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Table B9.  Determinants of Ranking Decisions in the Low Information treatments  
 
 
      Dependent variable: Rank given to subject j in Period t 
 
 
   
Independent Variable LI-LG 
(1) 
LI-HG 
(2)  
   
   
(a) Subject j‘s Perceived 
Average Previous 
Contribution 
-0.12*** 
(0.012) 
-0.072*** 
(0.0071) 
   
(b) The Number of Interaction 
with Subject j prior 
to Period t 
0.052 
(0.035) 
-0.37*** 
(0.032) 
   
Constant 3.17*** 3.55*** 
 (0.040) (0.048) 
   
# of Observations 6495 6385 
Log Likelihood -11302.2 -11041.5 
Chi-squared 101.4 231.7 
Prob > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 
   
 
 
 
Notes: Individual random effect Tobit regressions. Only observations whose variable (a) is defined are used. The 
numbers of left-censored observations are 1299  in column (1), and 1277 in column (2); numbers of right-censored 
observations are identical, since subjects are required to assign both the minimum and the maximum rank (as well as 
each of the intervening ranks) in every period..  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
     
Remark: The subjects‘ potential partners' perceived average contribution in period t are calculated as follows: 
     
(1) If a subject had interacted with a potential partner (which s/he would rank in period t) before period t, the 
average of the partner‘s past contributions  during their periods of interaction is used as the potential partner‘s 
contribution;  
     
(2) If the subject hadn‘t interacted with the potential partner, the median of the average contributions made by 
potential partners with whom he has interacted at least once is used. 
 
  
37 
 
Table B10. Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Coefficients between subjects’ own actual standing 
(relative past average contribution) and partner’s 
 
 
Calculation Methods: 
 
Step 1: We arrange each subject‘s five potential period t partners‘ actual average past 
contributions in a descending order, and then give a number to each of them from 1 to 5; a 
subject with higher average past contribution decision is ranked with a smaller number. We call 
the numbers the ―standing of subjects‖ (from 1st to 5th). 
 
Step 2: Likewise, we calculate each subject‘s own standing (from 1st to 5th) within the group of 
five amongst whom he is compared by prospective partners in period t. 
 
In Step 1 and Step 2, actual average past contribution of subject i in period t  {2, 3, ..., 10} is 
calculated by the average of i‘s t − 1 past contribution decisions. 
 
Step 3: We calculate Pearson‘s bivariate correlation coefficients between pairs, separately for 
each treatment.  
    
If the ranking procedure and partner assignment algorithm matched like-minded or at least like-
behaving subjects (high contributors with high contributors, low contributors with low 
contributors) as a pair, then, the bivariate correlation coefficients would be more highly positive 
and significant.  
    
We calculate the bivariate correlation coefficients for each treatment period by period, using all 
pairings in a given treatment and period without regard to the subject set or session in which 
each pair arises. 
 
 
The bivariate correlation coefficients are not calculated in the first period of each phase since 
average past contribution information is entirely unavailable in that period so pairings should be 
effectively random. 
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(1) LI-LG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The actual standing variable of a subject in period t is calculated based on the average contributions up to 
(and including) period t-1 of five subjects in his subgroup: the actual standing variable equals x{1, 2, …, 5} if his 
average past contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.   
Pearson's correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.116 0.475
Period 3 0.565*** 0.000
Period 4 0.022 0.892
Period 5 0.196 0.224
Period 6 0.634*** 0.000
Period 7 -0.095 0.561
Period 8 0.179 0.268
Period 9 -0.006 0.973
Period 10 0.079 0.626
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.639*** 0.000
Period 13 -0.244 0.128
Period 14 0.045 0.781
Period 15 0.531*** 0.000
Period 16 -0.484*** 0.001
Period 17 -0.077 0.636
Period 18 0.375** 0.017
Period 19 0.087 0.595
Period 20 -0.045 0.782
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.256 0.111
Period 23 0.128 0.431
Period 24 0.474*** 0.002
Period 25 0.472*** 0.002
Period 26 -0.281* 0.078
Period 27 0.41*** 0.008
Period 28 0.596*** 0.000
Period 29 0.148 0.362
Period 30 0.319** 0.045
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.779*** 0.000
Period 33 0.244 0.129
Period 34 0.172 0.288
Period 35 -0.055 0.737
Period 36 0.857*** 0.000
Period 37 0.231 0.152
Period 38 0.213 0.187
Period 39 0.659*** 0.000
Period 40 0.523*** 0.001
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(2) MI-LG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The actual standing variable of a subject in period t is calculated based on the average contributions up to 
(and including) period t-1 of five subjects in his subgroup: the actual standing variable equals x{1, 2, …, 5} if his 
average past contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.   
Pearson correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.064 0.696
Period 3 -0.003 0.983
Period 4 0.136 0.402
Period 5 0.741*** 0.000
Period 6 0.457*** 0.003
Period 7 0.732*** 0.000
Period 8 0.472*** 0.002
Period 9 0.558*** 0.000
Period 10 0.498*** 0.001
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.412*** 0.008
Period 13 0.444*** 0.004
Period 14 0.144 0.375
Period 15 0.598*** 0.000
Period 16 0.566*** 0.000
Period 17 0.59*** 0.000
Period 18 0.175 0.279
Period 19 0.562*** 0.000
Period 20 0.432*** 0.005
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.055 0.735
Period 23 0.512*** 0.001
Period 24 0.583*** 0.000
Period 25 0.84*** 0.000
Period 26 0.653*** 0.000
Period 27 0.567*** 0.000
Period 28 0.646*** 0.000
Period 29 0.63*** 0.000
Period 30 0.606*** 0.000
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.5*** 0.001
Period 33 0.169 0.296
Period 34 0.491*** 0.001
Period 35 0.479*** 0.002
Period 36 0.298* 0.062
Period 37 0.497*** 0.001
Period 38 0.534*** 0.000
Period 39 0.466*** 0.002
Period 40 0.742*** 0.000
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(3) HI-LG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The actual standing variable of a subject in period t is calculated based on the average contributions up to 
(and including) period t-1 of five subjects in his subgroup: the actual standing variable equals x{1, 2, …, 5} if his 
average past contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
Pearson's correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.536*** 0.000
Period 3 0.639*** 0.000
Period 4 0.882*** 0.000
Period 5 0.783*** 0.000
Period 6 0.959*** 0.000
Period 7 0.837*** 0.000
Period 8 0.779*** 0.000
Period 9 0.865*** 0.000
Period 10 0.763*** 0.000
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.657*** 0.000
Period 13 0.882*** 0.000
Period 14 0.875*** 0.000
Period 15 0.632*** 0.000
Period 16 0.825*** 0.000
Period 17 0.867*** 0.000
Period 18 0.911*** 0.000
Period 19 0.82*** 0.000
Period 20 0.567*** 0.000
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.551*** 0.000
Period 23 0.606*** 0.000
Period 24 0.727*** 0.000
Period 25 0.593*** 0.000
Period 26 0.69*** 0.000
Period 27 0.81*** 0.000
Period 28 0.658*** 0.000
Period 29 0.582*** 0.000
Period 30 0.725*** 0.000
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.572*** 0.000
Period 33 0.512*** 0.001
Period 34 0.656*** 0.000
Period 35 0.816*** 0.000
Period 36 0.934*** 0.000
Period 37 0.808*** 0.000
Period 38 0.597*** 0.000
Period 39 0.32** 0.044
Period 40 0.675*** 0.000
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(4) LI-HG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The actual standing variable of a subject in period t is calculated based on the average contributions up to 
(and including) period t-1 of five subjects in his subgroup: the actual standing variable equals x{1, 2, …, 5} if his 
average past contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
Pearson's correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.124 0.446
Period 3 0.265* 0.097
Period 4 -0.009 0.958
Period 5 0.045 0.781
Period 6 -0.010 0.950
Period 7 0.265* 0.097
Period 8 0.382** 0.015
Period 9 0.294* 0.065
Period 10 0.172 0.288
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.243 0.131
Period 13 0.499*** 0.001
Period 14 -0.049 0.762
Period 15 0.108 0.508
Period 16 0.211 0.191
Period 17 0.38** 0.015
Period 18 0.542*** 0.000
Period 19 0.256 0.111
Period 20 0.276* 0.084
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 -0.339** 0.032
Period 23 0.371** 0.018
Period 24 0.163 0.316
Period 25 0.426*** 0.006
Period 26 0.328** 0.038
Period 27 0.066 0.684
Period 28 0.092 0.573
Period 29 0.31* 0.052
Period 30 0.398** 0.011
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.110 0.501
Period 33 0.116 0.477
Period 34 -0.193 0.233
Period 35 0.286* 0.074
Period 36 0.166 0.307
Period 37 0.363** 0.021
Period 38 0.645*** 0.000
Period 39 0.347** 0.028
Period 40 0.49*** 0.001
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(5) MI-HG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The actual standing variable of a subject in period t is calculated based on the average contributions up to 
(and including) period t-1 of five subjects in his subgroup: the actual standing variable equals x{1, 2, …, 5} if his 
average past contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.   
Pearson correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.362** 0.010
Period 3 0.414*** 0.003
Period 4 0.371*** 0.008
Period 5 0.463*** 0.001
Period 6 0.129 0.370
Period 7 0.394*** 0.005
Period 8 0.476*** 0.000
Period 9 0.641*** 0.000
Period 10 0.596*** 0.000
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.184 0.200
Period 13 0.148 0.305
Period 14 0.597*** 0.000
Period 15 0.506*** 0.000
Period 16 0.635*** 0.000
Period 17 0.782*** 0.000
Period 18 0.734*** 0.000
Period 19 0.48*** 0.000
Period 20 0.288** 0.042
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.259* 0.069
Period 23 0.514*** 0.000
Period 24 0.577*** 0.000
Period 25 -0.097 0.504
Period 26 0.586*** 0.000
Period 27 0.523*** 0.000
Period 28 0.354** 0.011
Period 29 0.599*** 0.000
Period 30 0.62*** 0.000
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.000 1.000
Period 33 0.071 0.622
Period 34 0.263* 0.065
Period 35 0.54*** 0.000
Period 36 0.551*** 0.000
Period 37 0.408*** 0.003
Period 38 0.463*** 0.001
Period 39 0.264* 0.064
Period 40 0.602*** 0.000
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(6) HI-HG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The actual standing variable of a subject in period t is calculated based on the average contributions up to 
(and including) period t-1 of five subjects in his subgroup: the actual standing variable equals x{1, 2, …, 5} if his 
average past contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
Pearson's correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.58*** 0.000
Period 3 0.584*** 0.000
Period 4 0.55*** 0.000
Period 5 0.719*** 0.000
Period 6 0.556*** 0.000
Period 7 0.696*** 0.000
Period 8 0.703*** 0.000
Period 9 0.469*** 0.002
Period 10 0.814*** 0.000
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.391** 0.012
Period 13 0.808*** 0.000
Period 14 0.333** 0.036
Period 15 0.979*** 0.000
Period 16 0.585*** 0.000
Period 17 0.79*** 0.000
Period 18 0.76*** 0.000
Period 19 0.589*** 0.000
Period 20 0.614*** 0.000
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.497*** 0.001
Period 23 0.347** 0.028
Period 24 0.61*** 0.000
Period 25 0.716*** 0.000
Period 26 0.505*** 0.001
Period 27 0.803*** 0.000
Period 28 0.529*** 0.000
Period 29 0.551*** 0.000
Period 30 0.456*** 0.003
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.359** 0.023
Period 33 0.581*** 0.000
Period 34 0.378** 0.016
Period 35 0.551*** 0.000
Period 36 0.675*** 0.000
Period 37 0.607*** 0.000
Period 38 0.46*** 0.003
Period 39 0.52*** 0.001
Period 40 0.769*** 0.000
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Table B11. Pearson’s Bivariate Correlation Coefficients between subjects’ own 
recorded/perceived contribution standing and partner’s recorded/perceived standing   
 
This analysis differs from that of Table B10 in that here we check the performance of the ranking 
procedure and matching algorithm with respect to pairing like individuals in terms only of the 
information available to the subjects themselves, rather than in terms of their actual full histories 
of contribution in a given phase. 
 
 
In the LI treatment, in each ranking stage, subjects possessed knowledge of the past contributions 
of potential partner only if the pair had already interacted during the phase.  This knowledge was 
available thanks to the identification of prospective partners by (within phase) fixed IDs, and the 
display of feedback on the partner‘s contribution at the end of each period. 
 
In the MI treatment, in each ranking stage, subjects were shown the past contribution of potential 
partners  taking into account only those periods randomly selected (with probability 50%) to be 
recorded for inclusion in this tally.  (Recollection of potential partners‘ actions in past 
interactions within the current phase based on ID numbers, as in the LI treatment, was also 
possible.) 
 
We calculate Pearson‘s bivariate correlation coefficients based only on their interaction 
experiences in the LI treatment, and only on their recorded average past contributions in the MI 
treatment. 
     
 
Calculation Methods: 
 
[In the MI treatment:] 
 
Step 1: We arrange five potential partners‘ ―recorded‖ average past contribution decisions in an 
descending order. If no average past contributions of a subject have been recorded, then, the 
median of the contribution decisions of all others among the five whose contribution decisions 
have been recorded at least once is assigned to that subject as his or her average past contribution. 
Based on these average numbers, we assign a standing number to each of them from 1 to 5 so 
that a subject with a higher average past contribution decision is ranked with a smaller number. 
We call the number the ―recorded/perceived standing of subjects‖ (from 1st to 5th), as opposed to 
the actual standing of subjects. 
     
Step 2: Likewise, we calculate each subject‘s own recorded/perceived standing (from 1st to 5th), 
based on her recorded/perceived average past contributions, within her own subset of five. 
 
In Step 1 and Step 2, we do not use data for the period and subject set in question if all five 
individuals in either of the five person subsets have had no contribution decision recorded thus 
far in the phase.  
 
Step 3: We calculate Pearson‘s bivariate correlation coefficients between pairs based on the 
recorded/perceived standing variable by treatment and by period.  
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If the ranking procedure matched like subjects as pairs, then, the bivariate correlation 
coefficients  be large and significant.  
    
Note that in this analysis, the bivariate correlation coefficients are not calculated in the first 
period of each phase, since average past contributions are never available in that period. 
 
 
[In the LI treatment:] 
 
Step 1: We calculate each of five potential partners‘ ―perceived‖ or experienced average past 
contribution decisions, based on their interaction results so far, and then, arrange them in an 
descending order. If a subject has not interacted with some potential partners, then, the median of 
the contribution decisions of all other potential partners with whom the subject has interacted at 
least once is assigned to that subject. Based on these, we give a number to each of the five 
potential partners from 1 to 5 so that a subject with higher experienced average contribution 
decision is ranked with a smaller number. We call the number the ―recorded/perceived standing 
of subjects‖ (from 1st to 5th) as in the MI treatment.6 
     
Step 2: Likewise, we calculate each subject‘s own recorded/perceived standing (from 1st to 5th), 
based on their experienced average past contributions in his subset of five. 
 
In Step 1 and Step 2, we do not use the data of a pair eventually matched for the period if one or 
both of the subjects had not yet interacted with any of her five potential partners.  
 
Step 3: We calculate Pearson‘s bivariate correlation coefficients between pairs based on the 
recorded/perceived standing variable by treatment and by period.  
    
Note that in these calculations, the bivariate correlation coefficients are not calculated not only in 
the first but also in the second period of each phase, since subjects will at most have had 
experience with only one other member of the potential partner sub-group, too few to allow 
assignment of relative ranks. 
 
 
  
                                                          
6
 In cases of tied contributions, we give all subjects concerned the same standing number, which is the first 
applicable integer. For example, suppose that five subjects have the average records 10, 5, 4 , 4, and 3, respectively. 
Then, the subject having 10 has standing rank 1, the subject with a record of 5 has standing rank 2, both subjects 
with a record of 4 have standing rank 3, and the subject whose past average contribution is 3 has standing rank 5.  
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(1) LI-LG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The subjects‘ or their partners‘ perceived standing  equals x {1, 2, …, 5} if his or her past perceived 
average contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects in his or her subset. Subjects‘ potential partners‘ 
perceived average contributions in period t are calculated as follows: (1) If a subject had interacted with a potential 
partner (which s/he would rank in period t) before period t, the average of the partner‘s past contribution decisions  
in periods played with the subject is used as the potential partner‘s contribution; (2) If the subject hadn‘t interacted 
with the potential partner, the median of the average contributions made by potential partners with whom he has 
interacted at least once is used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 
level, respectively.   
Pearson's correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 N/A N/A
Period 3 -0.143 0.379
Period 4 0.040 0.806
Period 5 -0.021 0.898
Period 6 0.306* 0.055
Period 7 0.279* 0.081
Period 8 -0.018 0.914
Period 9 -0.310* 0.051
Period 10 0.162 0.317
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 N/A N/A
Period 13 0.467*** 0.002
Period 14 0.253 0.114
Period 15 0.375** 0.017
Period 16 0.081 0.617
Period 17 0.121 0.457
Period 18 0.000 1.000
Period 19 -0.192 0.235
Period 20 -0.181 0.262
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 N/A N/A
Period 23 -0.176 0.276
Period 24 0.200 0.216
Period 25 -0.103 0.528
Period 26 -0.104 0.523
Period 27 -0.015 0.926
Period 28 -0.089 0.585
Period 29 -0.002 0.992
Period 30 0.097 0.552
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 N/A N/A
Period 33 -0.026 0.875
Period 34 0.283* 0.076
Period 35 0.000 1.000
Period 36 0.167 0.304
Period 37 0.286* 0.074
Period 38 -0.026 0.875
Period 39 0.201 0.212
Period 40 0.265* 0.098
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(2) MI-LG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The recorded standing variable of a subject in period t equals x {1, 2, …, 5} if his or her past 
recorded/perceived average contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five potential partners. The standing variable in 
period t is calculated based on the recorded average contributions up to (and including) period t−1 of five subjects in 
his subgroup. If the subject‘s contribution has not been recorded by then, the median of other members‘ recorded 
average contributions in his subgroup is used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level 
and at the .01 level, respectively.   
Pearson correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.007 0.966
Period 3 0.202 0.210
Period 4 0.483*** 0.002
Period 5 0.599*** 0.000
Period 6 0.627*** 0.000
Period 7 0.684*** 0.000
Period 8 0.756*** 0.000
Period 9 0.571*** 0.000
Period 10 0.797*** 0.000
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.334** 0.035
Period 13 0.329** 0.038
Period 14 0.602*** 0.000
Period 15 0.471*** 0.002
Period 16 0.572*** 0.000
Period 17 0.701*** 0.000
Period 18 0.529*** 0.000
Period 19 0.536*** 0.000
Period 20 0.457*** 0.003
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.395** 0.011
Period 23 0.331** 0.037
Period 24 0.544*** 0.000
Period 25 0.535*** 0.000
Period 26 0.621*** 0.000
Period 27 0.573*** 0.000
Period 28 0.439*** 0.005
Period 29 0.343** 0.030
Period 30 0.726*** 0.000
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 -0.118 0.468
Period 33 0.177 0.273
Period 34 0.644*** 0.000
Period 35 0.621*** 0.000
Period 36 0.685*** 0.000
Period 37 0.723*** 0.000
Period 38 0.886*** 0.000
Period 39 0.550*** 0.000
Period 40 0.691*** 0.000
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(3) LI-HG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The subjects‘ or their partners‘ perceived standing equals x {1, 2, …, 5} if his or her past perceived average 
contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects in his or her subgroup. Subjects‘ potential partners‘ perceived 
average contributions in period t are calculated as follows: (1) If a subject had interacted with a potential partner 
(which s/he would rank in period t) before period t, the average of the partner‘s past contribution decisions in 
periods played with the subject is used as the potential partner‘s contribution; (2) If the subject hadn‘t interacted 
with the potential partner, the median of the average contributions made by potential partners with whom he has 
interacted at least once is used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 
level, respectively. 
Pearson's correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 N/A N/A
Period 3 -0.143 0.379
Period 4 -0.099 0.544
Period 5 -0.212 0.188
Period 6 0.236 0.143
Period 7 0.032 0.843
Period 8 0.654*** 0.000
Period 9 -0.341** 0.031
Period 10 0.380** 0.015
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 N/A N/A
Period 13 0.444*** 0.004
Period 14 0.063 0.702
Period 15 -0.026 0.875
Period 16 0.16 0.325
Period 17 0.061 0.708
Period 18 0.279* 0.081
Period 19 0.306* 0.055
Period 20 0.241 0.133
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 N/A N/A
Period 23 0.314** 0.048
Period 24 0.048 0.770
Period 25 -0.067 0.683
Period 26 0.213 0.187
Period 27 0.16 0.325
Period 28 0.437*** 0.005
Period 29 0.061 0.708
Period 30 -0.039 0.811
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 N/A N/A
Period 33 0.283* 0.076
Period 34 -0.25 0.119
Period 35 0.121 0.457
Period 36 -0.008 0.959
Period 37 0.424*** 0.006
Period 38 0.457*** 0.003
Period 39 0.385** 0.014
Period 40 -0.25 0.119
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(4) MI-HG treatment 
 
 
 
Notes: The recorded standing variable of a subject in period t equals x {1, 2, …, 5} if his or her past 
recorded/perceived average contribution is the x
th
 highest among the five subjects. The standing variable in period t 
is calculated based on the recorded average contributions up to (and including) period t−1 of five subjects in his 
subgroup. If the subject‘s contribution has not been recorded by then, the median of other members‘ recorded 
average contributions in his subgroup is used. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level 
and at the .01 level, respectively.  
Pearson correlation p -value (two-sided)
Period 1 N/A N/A
Period 2 0.004 0.978
Period 3 0.055 0.702
Period 4 0.515*** 0.000
Period 5 0.738*** 0.000
Period 6 0.579*** 0.000
Period 7 0.497*** 0.000
Period 8 0.642*** 0.000
Period 9 0.726*** 0.000
Period 10 0.550*** 0.000
Period 11 N/A N/A
Period 12 0.537*** 0.000
Period 13 0.072 0.620
Period 14 0.225 0.116
Period 15 0.585*** 0.000
Period 16 0.613*** 0.000
Period 17 0.655*** 0.000
Period 18 0.806*** 0.000
Period 19 0.600*** 0.000
Period 20 0.608*** 0.000
Period 21 N/A N/A
Period 22 0.047 0.746
Period 23 0.097 0.502
Period 24 0.535*** 0.000
Period 25 0.192 0.180
Period 26 0.334** 0.018
Period 27 0.503*** 0.000
Period 28 0.466*** 0.001
Period 29 0.832*** 0.000
Period 30 0.360** 0.010
Period 31 N/A N/A
Period 32 0.387*** 0.005
Period 33 0.545*** 0.000
Period 34 0.450*** 0.001
Period 35 0.503*** 0.000
Period 36 0.560*** 0.000
Period 37 0.357** 0.011
Period 38 0.550*** 0.000
Period 39 0.329** 0.020
Period 40 0.441*** 0.001
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Table B12.  The Partial Correlation between Subjects’ own and their partners’ average past contributions  
    
 
(I) Between Subjects‘ own and their partners‘ actual average past contributions  
      
 
(Ia) Dependent Variable: Subject‘s average contribution for all previous periods in Period t 
      
            
         
 
 
Factor of 1.3 (LG) Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
            
Independent 
Variable 
Low info Medium info High info Low info Medium info High info 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
             
(a) Subject‘s period 
t partner average 
past contribution for 
all past periods 
0.22*** 
(0.027) 
0.22*** 
(0.027) 
0.26*** 
(0.023) 
0.25*** 
(0.022) 
0.57*** 
(0.022) 
0.55*** 
(0.022) 
0.13*** 
(0.027) 
0.12*** 
(0.026) 
0.46*** 
(0.031) 
0.42*** 
(0.030) 
0.51*** 
(0.036) 
0.47*** 
(0.034) 
             
             
Constant ---- 0.28*** ---- 3.42*** ---- 2.59*** ---- 4.07*** ---- 6.03*** ---- 6.18*** 
  (0.57)  (0.60)  (0.30)  (1.13)  (0.50)  (0.54) 
             
# of Observations 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1440 1400 1800 1800 1440 1440 
Log likelihood -2214.8 -2214.7 -2717.7 -2705.8 -2936.8 -2914.7 -2255.3 -2249.4 -2873.3 -2836.3 -1914.5 -1881.8 
F 69.3 67.8 135.4 128.4 656.7 649.6 23.7 21.6 226.4 205.6 202.0 194.5 
Prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
             
 
 
Notes: Individual random effect Tobit regressions.  Observations in all periods but period 1 are used. The numbers of left-(right-) censored observations are 
567(37) in columns (1) and (2), 200(216) in columns (3) and (4), 58(154) in columns (5) and (6), 331(335) in columns (7) and (8), 39(821) in columns (9) and 
(10), 25(789) in columns (11) and (12). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(Ib) Tests for the equality of coefficients on variable (a) included in Appendix Table (Ia) (above) 
 
 
 
  Treatment 
  
Column (1) Column (3) Column (5) Column (7) Column (9) Column (11) 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
Column (1) ---- .4018 .0000*** .0110** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (3) ---- ---- .0000*** .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (5) ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0004*** .2652 
Column (7) ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (9) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0465** 
  
 
 
  Treatment 
  
Column (2) Column (4) Column (6) Column (8) Column (10) Column (12) 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
Column (2) ---- .2951 .0000*** .0196** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (4) ---- ---- .0000*** .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (6) ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0005*** .2709 
Column (8) ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (10) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0466** 
  
 
Note: Two-sided Chi-squared tests. Numbers are p-values. For these tests, we first estimated pooled regressions 
of the relevant pair of columns to obtain the coefficient estimates, then performed then performed Chi-squared 
tests. 
  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(II) Dependent Variable: Subject‘s average contribution for previously recorded periods as of 
period t (supplementing the regression analysis in (I) above) 
 
 
      
      
     
 
MI-LG MI-HG 
 
    
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(a) Subject‘s period t partner‘s 
average past contribution for 
past periods for which 
information is recorded 
0.48*** 
(0.031) 
0.46** 
(0.031) 
0.69*** 
(0.040) 
0.63**** 
(0.038) 
     
     
Constant ---- 2.61*** ---- 5.15*** 
  (0.70)  (0.58) 
     
# of Observations 1166 1166 1530 1530 
Log Likelihood -2151.8 -2145.9 -2327.9 -2302.0 
Chi-squared 234.5 225.0 294.1 275.8 
Prob > Chi-squared .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
     
 
 
 
Notes: Individual random effect Tobit regressions. Only observations for which at least one past contribution has 
been recorded for both self and partner, so that variable (a) can be calculated are used. The numbers of left- (right-) 
censored observations are 209(224) in columns (1) and (2), 63(780) in columns (3) and (4). 
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(III) Between Subjects‘ own and their partners‘ recorded/perceived average past contributions (supplementing the analysis in (I)). 
      
(IIIa) Dependent Variable: Subject‘s recorded/perceived average past contribution in Period t 
 
Remark: See the description included in Table B11 concerning the method to calculate the recorded/perceived past average 
contribution. 
      
     
            
         
 
 
Factor of 1.3 (LG) Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
            
Independent 
Variable 
Low info Medium info High info Low info Medium info High info 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
             
(a) Subject‘s period 
t partner's 
recorded/perceived 
average past 
contribution  
0.23*** 
(0.046) 
0.22*** 
(0.050) 
0.41*** 
(0.032) 
0.39*** 
(0.031) 
0.57*** 
(0.022) 
0.55*** 
(0.022) 
0.32*** 
(0.056) 
0.27*** 
(0.054) 
0.94*** 
(0.032) 
0.87*** 
(0.030) 
0.51*** 
(0.036) 
0.47*** 
(0.034) 
             
             
Constant ---- 0.055 ---- 3.20*** ---- 2.59*** ---- 3.62*** ---- 2.77*** ---- 6.18*** 
  (0.78)  (0.61)  (0.30)  (0.65)  (0.41)  (0.54) 
             
# of Observations 1214 1214 1430 1430 1440 1440 1186 1186 1950 1950 1440 1440 
Log likelihood -2139.7 -2139.7 -2843.2 -2832.5 -2936.8 -2914.7 -2433.0 -2420.5 -3260.1 -3241.9 -1914.5 -1881.8 
F 25.2 20.0 163.8 153.4 656.7 649.6 32.9 24.7 873.8 824.8 202.0 194.5 
Prob > F .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000 
             
 
 
Notes: Individual random effect Tobit regressions.  The numbers of left- (right-) censored observations is 537 (20) in columns (1) and (2), 241 (280) in columns 
(3) and (4), 58 (154) in columns (5) and (6), 289 (271) in columns (7) and (8), 77 (913) in columns (9) and (10), 25 (789) in columns (11) and (12). Estimates in 
columns (5), (6), (11) and (12) are the same as those in Panel (Ia) above. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, 
respectively. 
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(IIIb) Tests for the equality of coefficients on variable (a) included in the Table (IIIa) 
 
 
 
  Treatment 
  
Column (1) Column (3) Column (5) Column (7) Column (9) Column (11) 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
Column (1) ---- .4018 .0000*** .0110** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (3) ---- ---- .0000*** .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (5) ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0004*** .2652 
Column (7) ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (9) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0465** 
  
 
 
  Treatment 
  
Column (2) Column (4) Column (6) Column (8) Column (10) Column (12) 
T
re
at
m
en
t 
Column (2) ---- .0006*** .0000*** .6255 .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (4) ---- ---- .0000*** .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (6) ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** .0838* 
Column (8) ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Column (10) ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0008** 
  
 
Note: Two-sided Chi-squared tests. Numbers are p-values. For these tests, For these tests, we first estimated 
pooled regressions of the relevant pair of columns to obtain the coefficient estimates, then performed then 
performed Chi-squared tests. 
  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table B13. The Distribution of the Number of Periods for Which Specific Pairing (i, j) was Realised by Phase and Treatment  
 
(1) Phase 1 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 38.5% 28.0% 30.5% 29.5% 29.2% 30.0% 
2 15.5% 15.0% 13.5% 14.0% 14.8% 11.0% 
3 6.5% 5.0% 7.0% 5.5% 6.4% 6.0% 
4 2.0% 4.0% 2.5% 2.5% 2.8% 3.5% 
5 0.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.5% 
6 0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1.5% 0.8% 0.5% 
7 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 0.0% 1.5% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
       
(2) Phase 2 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 37.0% 29.5% 28.0% 25.0% 26.8% 29.5% 
2 15.0% 13.5% 13.0% 14.0% 13.6% 11.5% 
3 5.0% 7.0% 7.0% 5.0% 7.2% 5.5% 
4 3.0% 3.5% 3.0% 2.0% 4.4% 2.0% 
5 0.5% 1.0% 2.0% 2.0% 0.4% 1.5% 
6 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 1.0% 0.8% 2.0% 
7 0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
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(3) Phase 3 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 36.5% 27.5% 25.5% 30.0% 27.6% 26.0% 
2 18.0% 15.0% 18.5% 16.0% 14.4% 15.5% 
3 4.5% 8.5% 7.5% 6.5% 8.0% 4.5% 
4 2.0% 3.5% 2.5% 2.5% 1.6% 4.5% 
5 0.5% 0.0% 1.0% 0.5% 1.2% 1.0% 
6 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 1.0% 1.2% 0.5% 
7 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
       
(4) Phase 4 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 32.5% 28.5% 25.0% 27.5% 28.0% 30.5% 
2 12.0% 17.5% 18.5% 13.0% 12.4% 12.5% 
3 6.0% 4.5% 7.0% 6.0% 8.8% 7.5% 
4 0.5% 1.5% 3.0% 1.5% 2.4% 1.5% 
5 1.5% 1.5% 1.0% 1.0% 0.8% 2.0% 
6 1.5% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 1.2% 1.0% 
7 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 
8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
9 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
10 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
Note. The pairing of a subject i and a subject j is said to endure or be realised for a certain number of periods of a phase regardless of interruptions.  For example, 
if i and j are paired in a phase‘s periods 1, 2, 5 and 7 only, their pairing was for 4 periods; if they were paired in periods 4, 5, 6 and 7 only, their pairing is also of 
4 period duration.  
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Table B14. Gains due to a Longer Partnership with a Specific Partner 
 
(1) Average earnings by # of periods for which specific subject i and j were matched, by phase and treatment  
 
(a) Phase 1 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 10.63 11.09 11.00 13.09 14.29 14.97 
2 10.76 10.94 10.82 12.81 13.70 14.32 
3 11.04 10.87 10.86 13.37 13.88 15.24 
4 11.24 11.17 10.81 15.00 13.54 14.07 
5 N/A 11.31 10.03 N/A 14.81 17.00 
6 12.65 11.61 13.00 16.32 15.60 16.42 
7 N/A N/A 10.15 15.83 N/A 16.12 
8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
       
(b) Phase 2 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 10.37 11.01 10.99 12.68 14.01 14.51 
2 10.25 10.90 10.93 11.72 14.69 15.58 
3 10.34 10.71 11.04 11.40 14.11 15.15 
4 11.68 11.20 11.38 14.11 14.58 16.19 
5 10.15 11.52 12.19 15.12 11.26 14.48 
6 N/A N/A 10.08 15.98 16.42 16.42 
7 11.80 12.79 N/A 17.00 N/A 10.15 
8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 N/A N/A N/A 17.00 N/A N/A 
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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(c) Phase 3 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 10.26 10.83 11.19 12.15 14.75 14.70 
2 10.18 11.00 11.16 12.25 14.55 15.51 
3 10.28 11.27 11.03 13.41 14.65 15.67 
4 11.00 11.91 11.77 15.69 15.95 14.32 
5 11.77 N/A 11.45 14.34 16.07 16.30 
6 N/A 10.45 N/A 15.80 16.71 17.00 
7 11.54 N/A N/A N/A N/A 17.00 
8 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
       
(d) Phase 4 
      
       
# of periods for which 
specific (i, j) has been paired 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
1 10.16 11.06 11.39 11.97 15.15 15.41 
2 10.15 11.04 11.28 11.94 14.20 14.79 
3 10.17 10.86 11.64 13.12 14.86 15.20 
4 12.14 10.78 10.42 14.26 16.64 16.04 
5 10.07 12.42 12.16 16.30 16.09 15.01 
6 11.66 11.03 N/A 16.21 16.42 15.31 
7 11.13 13.00 N/A 15.85 N/A N/A 
8 N/A N/A N/A 14.55 N/A N/A 
9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
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(2) Test Results: Is a longer partnership beneficial for subjects? 
 
     Procedure – The method of testing the impact of a long partnership on earnings is: 
 
Step 1: In each phase, for each subject, we identify (a) the partner with whom he or she played the most times in a given phase as 
well as (b) a partner with whom he or she played not more than 2 times and with whom the match was of the shortest duration 
for that subject in that phase. 
Step 2: If the number of periods in (a) above is at least 4, and if a pair in (b) above also exists, we use the subject in this test.  
Step 3: We calculate (c) that subject‘s average earnings in the longest relationship (in the pair (a)), and (d) his or her average 
earnings in the pairs in (b). If there are more than one pair in (c) (or (d)), we calculate the average of these. 
Step 4: By using individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, we calculate whether the difference between (c) and (d) is 
significant or not.  
     
       
      
 
Treatment 
 
LI-LG MI-LG HI-LG LI-HG MI-HG HI-HG 
 
# of obs. 
p-value 
(two-
sided) 
# of 
obs. 
p-value 
(two-
sided) 
# of obs. 
p-value 
(two-
sided) 
# of 
obs. 
p-value 
(two-
sided) 
# of 
obs. 
p-value 
(two-
sided) 
# of 
obs. 
p-value 
(two-
sided) 
       
      
       
      
Phase 1 10 .1394 24 .4237 18 .0741* 18 .0123** 21 .7151 24 .4154 
Phase 2 16 .0299** 18 .7439 20 .1850 21 .0008*** 24 .0741* 22 1.000 
Phase 3 11 .0128** 12 .1167 14 .1981 15 .0782* 18 .1107 23 .6925 
Phase 4 18 .0020*** 17 .8870 15 .1914 18 .0346** 20 .2459 16 .4531 
       
      
 
Notes: Individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks test.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Results: 
    
In the LI treatments, regardless of which factor, 1.3 (LG) or 1.7 (HG), is used, the average earnings of a pair appear to be larger as 
the duration of the partnership is longer. According to Wilcoxon signed ranks tests, the efficacy of longer partnership is significant in 
Phase 2 to 4 of the LI-LG treatment and in all four phases in the LI-HG treatment. 
 
In the MI treatments, it appears that the effects of the longer partnership is weak or that no such effects exist; Wilcoxon signed ranks 
tests do not detect a significant difference in the average earnings between those with longer partnerships and those who interacted at 
most twice. 
 
In the HI-HG treatments, the average earnings appear to be larger as the pairs have interacted more times in Phases 1 and 3; but, the 
increase is not significant, according to Wilcoxon signed ranks tests. 
    
These results are suggestive only, since these are based on individual-level Wilcoxon signed ranks tests with small samples. 
 
However, they suggest that repeated interaction with known partners is a key to more cooperative outcomes when subjects cannot 
form reputations with those they have not interacted with, whereas it is unimportant when they can do so.  
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(3) Individual-level Mann-Whitney tests for the differences in average earnings by treatment, for specific numbers of periods for 
which given (i, j) were paired 
 
(a) Phase 1 
                                 (i) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 1                (ii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0751* .0785* .0004*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .5070 .2669 .0000*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .7561 .0078*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .7677 .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0127** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .0001*** .0000*** .0000** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0091*** .0004***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .1749 .0081*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1372  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0895* 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
                       (iii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 3                (iv) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- 1.000 .7817 .0071*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .7132 .7886 .0099*** .0288** .0137** 
Medium info ---- ---- .7456 .0191* .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .2254 .0034*** .0112** .0014*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0070*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .0040*** .0049*** .0005*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .2945 .0497**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .2657 .2621 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1008  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .7127 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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              (v) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 5                (vi) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 6 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  ---- 1.000 1.000 .0442** .0603* .1213 
Medium info ---- ---- .2454 N/A .0543* .0603*  ---- ---- 1.000 .1697 .2805 .2405 
High info ---- ---- ---- N/A .0101** .0565*  ---- ---- ---- .0429** .0565* .1025 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A  ---- ---- ---- ---- .3789 .7343 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1772  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3476 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
 
             (vii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 7             
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)    
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 
      
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A        
Medium info ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- .0641* N/A .0429**        
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A .3909        
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----        
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(b) Phase 2 
 
                        (i) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 1                (ii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0199** .0172** .0001*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .1602 .0002*** .0377** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .9346 .0115* .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .2740 .2306 .0000*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0161** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .6820 .0000*** .0000*** 
II. Factor of 
1.7  
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0066*** .0004***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3482  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0170* 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
                       (iii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 3                (iv) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .3459 .0627* .1163 .0000*** .0000***  ---- .8773 .5253 .0015*** .0004*** .0005*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .2941 .3463 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .4251 .0021*** .0003*** .0005*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .7776 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .0025*** .0007*** .0007*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0004*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .7048 .4323 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .4020  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2183 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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           (v) # of periods for which specific (i, j) has been paired = 5                (vi) # of periods for which specific (i, j) has been paired = 6 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0641* .1161 .0361** 1.000 .0442**  ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Medium info ---- ---- .8649 .0107** .6434 .0325**  ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0062*** .6004 .0384**  ---- ---- ---- .0641* .0565* .0345** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0667* .8961  ---- ---- ---- ---- .5439 .2996 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1798  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 1.000 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
 
        (vii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) has been paired = 7             
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)    
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 
      
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .1213 N/A .1025 N/A .1213        
Medium info ---- ---- N/A .1025 N/A .1213        
High info ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A        
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A .1025        
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----        
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(c) Phase 3 
 
                          (i) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 1                (ii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 2 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0386** .0012*** .0200** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .0110** .0000*** .0001*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .2941 .3620 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .4874 .0500** .0000*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .8608 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .0577* .0000*** .0000*** 
II. Factor of 
1.7  
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .7403  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .0183** 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
                         (iii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 3                (iv) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0828* .0071*** .0021*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .0596* .2478 .0004*** .0010*** .0153** 
Medium info ---- ---- .4511 .0055*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .8833 .0001*** .0008*** .0148** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0253** .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .0003*** .0009*** .0323** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0436** .0124**  ---- ---- ---- ---- .9259 .1076 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2125  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1273 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-value (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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             (v) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 5                (vi) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 6 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .6434 N/A .1213 .0331** .0565*  ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Medium info ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A  ---- ---- N/A .0641* .0319 .1025 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0641* .0083*** .0194**  ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .1554 .3404  ---- ---- ---- ---- .3774 .3476 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .6579  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3778 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
 
           (vii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 7             
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)    
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 
      
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A .1025        
Medium info ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A        
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A        
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----        
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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(d) Phase 4 
 
                 (i) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 1                        (ii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 2 
  
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0143** .0000*** .0187** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .0431** .0000*** .0045*** .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- .0639* .3393 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .0189** .1535 .0000*** .0000*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .8557 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .8816 .0000*** .0000*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0000*** .0000*** 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3164  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .1602 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
                 (iii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 3                (iv) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 4 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0000*** .0110** .0000*** .0000*** .0000***  ---- .1824 .1432 .3173 .0210** .0429** 
Medium info ---- ---- .0204** .1458 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- .8511 .0163** .0006*** .0038*** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .7401 .0000*** .0000***  ---- ---- ---- .0014*** .0000*** .0007*** 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- .0011*** .0002***  ---- ---- ---- ---- .0681* .1481 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .2597  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .4237 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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           (v) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 5                (vi) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 6 
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)  I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG) 
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0033*** .0083*** .0079*** .0081*** .0129**  ---- .2864 N/A .0103** .0038*** .0103** 
Medium info ---- ---- .8302 .0101** .0103** .0278**  ---- ---- N/A .0202** .0101** .0202** 
High info ---- ---- ---- .0194** .0202** .0608*  ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A 
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- 1.000 .2907  ---- ---- ---- ---- .3774 .5385 
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3865  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- .3774 
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----  ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- 
 
 
        (vii) # of periods for which specific (i, j) were paired = 7             
 
 
I. Factor of 1.3 (LG) II. Factor of 1.7 (HG)    
 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
Low  
info 
Medium 
info 
High 
info 
 
      
I. Factor of 1.3 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- .0603* N/A .0641* N/A N/A        
Medium info ---- ---- N/A .1025 N/A N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A N/A        
II. Factor of 1.7 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Low info ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A N/A        
Medium info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- N/A        
High info ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----        
 
Notes: Each individual pair‘s data is treated as an independent observation for this test. Numbers are p-values (two-sided). *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
